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Baldus and the Limits of Agency* 
 
Guido Rossi 
Edinburgh University 
guido.rossi@ed.ac.uk 
 
Most contributions on agency and representation in medieval law tend to look at collegiate offices, not 
individual ones: when, how and to what extent can a plurality of people be represented by a single 
individual. For individual offices - that is, offices not representing a collectivity - the approach was 
typically another. From the king to the magistrate, the office was not necessarily viewed as a different 
subject from that of the individual person discharging it, but rather construed as a series of powers 
vested in that person.  
Influenced by canon lawyers (chiefly, Innocent IV), Baldus de Ubaldis on the contrary approached the 
individual office in the same way as the collegiate one. Irrespectively of whether the office represented 
a plurality of people or designated a single individual, it remained a different subject from the person 
who exercised it. Construing the relationship between person and individual office in terms of agency 
provides a more penetrating insight into the dynamics of agency, which the 'standard' representation 
(the relationship between individual person and collectivity) sometimes fails to provide. Looking at the 
relationship between agent and individual office in the thought of Baldus, this contribution focuses on 
the limits within which the person of the agent can represent the office and act in its name. Just as the 
presence of lawful representation does not always allow the exercise of the office, so the lack of 
representation does not necessarily preclude the possibility of discharging it validly. Building on 
Innocent IV (but much unlike him), Baldus distinguishes between internal and external validity of 
agency. Because of this difference, the relationship between office and third parties does not always 
depend on that between office and agent. To reach this distinction, we will examine four degrees of 
separation between agent and office in Baldus' thought. First, obligations of the person vs. obligations 
of the office. Second, individual offices vs. collegiate bodies. Third, obligations that cannot be imputed 
to the office despite the full validity of its representative. Fourth, obligations that can be imputed to the 
office despite the lack of valid agency. 
A final note on terminology: from a strictly legal point of view, it would have been more correct to 
speak of representation, not of agency. The different choice is due to the simple fact that this work is 
largely focused on the distinction between agent and principal and the difference between internal and 
external validity of agency.  
 
1. Introduction 
2. Dignitas and agency 
2.1 Dignitas: worthiness and aptitude 
2.2. Agent and office  
2.3. Collegiate bodies and possessory issues. 
2.4. Agent versus office 
3. Towards the external relevance of invalid agency  
3.1. Agency and toleration of the unworthy agent 
3.2. Agency and possession of the office 
3.3. Agency triangle  
3.4. Possession vs. entitlement: the case of the lex Barbarius 
3.5. Breaking Innocent's symmetry: external validity vs. internal invalidity of agency  
4. Conclusion 
 
 
1. Introduction 
While not entirely neglected, the approach of medieval jurists to corporation theory 
has perhaps not received overwhelming attention among legal historians. This 
ultimately depends on the combination of two factors. On the one hand, looking at 
medieval civil law as a continuation of sort of Roman law. On the other, the 
predilection for Roman private law and the comparatively low interest in its public 
 2 
law dimension.1 Just as Roman law typically means Roman private law, so the study 
of medieval civil law usually focuses on private law issues. Those scholars who 
studied medieval corporation theory, in turn, seldom went beyond collegiate bodies. 
As a result, the (legal) analysis of individual offices has been almost entirely 
neglected. For the present purposes the term ‘individual office’ refers to any public 
office that does not designate and represent a collectivity or plurality of subjects, but a 
single one, such as the king, the judge, and so on. 
Most medieval jurists (civilians in particular) proved rather reluctant to extend agency 
to individual offices. Individual offices were typically considered as a series of 
powers vested in a person, not as a different person from that of the agent. Thus, agent 
and individual typically coincided, and this allowed to dispense with agency 
altogether. Corporations were different. There, the distinction between person and 
office was both conceptually more evident and, especially, clearly visible in practice. 
Moreover, this distinction was necessary. The late medieval urban world is a system 
of corporations. The jurists themselves typically lived in a city, and often a self-
governing one. Hence their interest in the mechanism of representation: how could the 
actions of the single be ascribed to the whole.2 To provide a legal (and logical) basis 
                                                        
* The subject of this essay touches on some questions also discussed in a much broader work, 
Representation and Ostensible Authority in Medieval Learned Law, forthcoming in Studien zur 
europäischen Rechtsgeschichte (Max-Planck-Institute for Legal History, Frankfurt-am-Main). I wish to 
thank Boudewijn Sirks, Peter Oestmann, Luca Loschiavo, Orazio Condorelli, Susanne Lepsius and 
Vincenzo Colli for their generous help, encouragement and advice. I am also grateful to the editors of 
the Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis for their suggestions, which have much improved this work, 
and the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland for its support. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1  Cf. S. Lepsius, Prätor und Prokonsul: Übersetzungsleistungen und Neuschöpfungen der 
mittelalterlichen Legisten im Umgang mit den römischen Ämtern, in J. Krynen and M. Stolleis (eds.), 
Science politique et droit public dans les facultés européennes (XIIIe-XVIIIe siècle), Frankfurt-am-
Main 2008, pp. 223-250, esp. 226. After all, the long-lasting partnership between Roman and modern 
private law is the main reason why Roman law is still taught - often in homeopathic dosage - in many 
European universities today. 
2 For a few essential references to a vast subject see P. Michaud-Quantin, Universitas. Expressions du 
Mouvement Communautaire dans le Moyen Âge Latin, Paris 1970, pp. 305-326; H. Coing, 
Europäisches Privatrecht, vol. 1, München 1985, pp. 262-268; J. Quillet, Universitas populi et 
Représentation au XIVo siècle, in A. Zimmerman (ed.), Der Begriff der repraesentatio im Mittelalter. 
Stellvertretung, Symbol, Zeichen, Bild, Berlin 1971, pp. 186-201, at 186-189; K. Nörr, Zur Frage des 
subjektiven Rechts in der Mittelalterlichen Rechtswissenschaft, in D. Medicu, H.-J. Mertens, K.W. 
Nörr and W. Zöllner (eds.), Festschrift für Hermann Lange zum 70. Geburtstag, Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln 
1992, pp. 193-204, at 194-197; B. Tierney, Corporatism, Individualism, and Consent: Locke and 
Premodern Thought, in M.E. Eichbauer and K. Pennington (eds.), Law as Profession and Practice in 
Medieval Europe: Essays in Honor of James A. Brundage, Ashgate 2011; reprint, Abingdon 2016, pp. 
49-72, at 62-63; A. Black, Guild and State. European Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to 
the Present, revised edn., London 2003, pp. 16-31; I. Birocchi, Persona giuridica nel diritto 
medioevale e moderno, in Digesto delle discipline privatistiche, Sezione civile, vol. 13, Roma 1995, pp. 
408-420, esp. 414-5; E. Cortese, Il diritto nella storia medievale, Roma 1995, vol. 2, pp. 238-240; F. 
Todescan, Dalla "Persona Ficta" alla "Persona Moralis", 11/12 (1982/83) Quaderni Fiorentini per la 
storia del pensiero giuridico italiano, pp. 59-93, esp. 63-64; H. Hofmann, Repräsentation. Studien zur 
Wort- und Begriffsgeschichte von der Antike bis ins 19. Jahrhundert, Berlin 1974, pp. 152-165; F. 
D'Urso, Persona giuridica e responsabilità penale. Note storico-giuridiche a proposito di recenti 
riforme, 29 (2000) Quaderni Fiorentini, pp. 511-550, esp. 524-531 and 542-548.  
On Bartolus in particular (and especially his comment on Dig.48.19.16.10) see H. Walther, Die 
Konstruktion der juristischen Person durch die Kanonistik im 13. Jahrhundert, in G. Mensching (ed.), 
Selbstbewusstsein und Person im Mittelalter, Würzburg 2005, pp. 195-212, at 196-200, and U. 
Navarrete, La posesión de las "universitates" especialmente en caso de extinción de todos sus 
mienabros, según Bartolo, in D. Segoloni et al. (eds.), Bartolo di Sassoferrato. Studi e documenti per il 
VI centenario, Milano 1962, vol. 2, pp. 347-372 at 351-360. Although the main jurists of the School of 
Orléans did not use the term persona representata, the concept behind it may be easily found also 
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for this mechanism, civilians progressively turned to canon law, borrowing an 
increasing number of principles thought for canonical elections, and applying them to 
the secular sphere.  
If civil lawyers did look at the concept of agency, they focused mainly on those 
instances where the principal was a collectivity, paying considerably less attention to 
individual offices. More than legal, the reason for this difference seems ultimately 
logical. Construing both individual offices and collegiate bodies as different subjects 
from those of their physical representatives would strike only a modern as something 
quite natural to do. Without the benefit of hindsight, there is no reason why we should 
take for granted the similarity between the representative of a collectivity and the 
bearer of an individual office, and so expect that also medieval lawyers would have 
studied both cases in terms of agent-principal relationship. 
This is the reason why these pages will focus on Baldus de Ubaldis: it is mainly with 
him that the distinction between person and office was fully worked out also for 
individual offices. Baldus did not invent this distinction, but rather applied to civil law 
some principles elaborated in canon law, especially by the great pope-lawyer Innocent 
IV. In so doing, however, he went beyond canon lawyers - and Innocent in particular. 
In retrospect, we could perhaps even say that what Innocent began, Baldus brought to 
conclusion. As it often happens, however, the continuity is only apparent: building on 
Innocent, Baldus went not just beyond the pope, but also against him. If Innocent 
highlighted the difference between person and individual office, Baldus managed to 
oppose one to the other, denying validity to the acts of the lawful agent when they 
clashed with the office he represented, and even allowing the office to act validly 
towards third parties when the agent lacked full legitimation to represent it. This way, 
Baldus introduced the difference between internal and external validity of agency.  
 
 
2. Dignitas and agency 
To appreciate the relationship between agent and office in Baldus, we should start 
with the concept of dignitas. Dignitas has two different meanings - or rather, two 
different objects: it can be referred both to an office and to a person. This is still 
visible in modern English, where the term 'dignity' means both the quality of being 
worthy of honour and a honourable position. The two meanings are complementary: 
only someone worthy of honour should occupy a honourable position; in turn, the 
honourable position attests to the honour of its holder. This circularity depends on the 
complexity of the concept of dignitas as applied to a person, for it means at the same 
time worthiness and aptitude - both the ethical condition of the person and his legal 
capacity to receive or hold something.3 
                                                                                                                                                              
there. On the subject the main work is still that of R. Feenstra, L’histoire des fondations. À propos de 
quelques études récentes, 24 (1956) Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis, pp. 381-448. Feenstra also 
provides a critical edition of the lengthy passage of Révigny's lectura on Dig.3.4.7.2 from the only two 
known manuscripts of Révigny's lectura on the Vetus (Leiden, University Library, MS d'Ablaing 2, 
and Napoli, Biblioteca nazionale, MS Branc.III.A.6), ibid., pp. 425-7. From Révigny's text it clearly 
appears that the term persona representata was already used by his teacher Jean de Monchy (ibid., p. 
428). While Feenstra does not mention Guido de Cumis (but he does refer to Belleperche, especially 
his comment on Cod.1.3.31(32), ibid., p. 424), also Cumis was familiar with the concept of 
corporation: see esp. his lectura on Dig.3.4.7, partly transcribed in F. D'Urso, loc. cit., p. 530, note 56. 
3 G. Rossi, Indignitas, Heresy and Schism: Canon Law and the iurisdictio of the mali pastores 129 
(2012) Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, Kanonistische Abteilung,  pp. 149-173, at 
150-152, where further literature. 
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While complex, dignitas remains a single concept, whose ethical and a legal 
meanings complement each other. The medieval world fully accepted the Pauline 
argument that any power is ordained by God4 - both in the sense that it comes from 
God and that its specific hierarchical position depends on His will. It was not difficult 
for the medieval jurists to apply this argument to the Roman sources: slightly revised, 
they seemed just to confirm it. Roman law was the product of a society of unequals, 
where it was perfectly normal that the dignores would occupy a higher position in 
society. Their social privileges, importantly, were at the same time legal ones. The 
medieval re-interpretation of Roman law through the lens of Christian thought 
justified the social hierarchy in terms of authority (the will of God), and provided a 
rational explanation for it in terms of superior moral qualities of those higher up the 
social ladder. 
 
2.1 Dignitas: worthiness and aptitude 
While the concept of dignitas is vast, we will focus only on what Baldus says. To do 
so, we shall look at some practical examples of the combination between moral and 
legal elements of dignitas, as referred both to persons and offices. 
Let us take the title of the Digest on senators (by definition the highest Roman class). 
The Romans considered of consular rank both men and women (their wives). 
Nonetheless, a man of consular rank would clearly take precedence over a woman of 
the same rank (Dig.1.9.1).5 In his comment on this text Baldus notes that 'the man is 
worthier (dignor) than the woman'.6 And he goes on immediately to apply this moral 
distinction of dignitas to legal scenarios. The patronus of an ecclesiastical benefice 
normally has the right to present a cleric to the bishop to be appointed to that benefice 
when it becomes vacant. What happens, asks Baldus, in case of disagreement between 
the heirs of the patron as to the next cleric to present to the bishop? If the heirs are a 
son and a daughter, then the solution is simple: 'the voice of the man is to be preferred 
to that of the woman, because it is worthier'.7 A clear consequence of this higher 
dignitas of the man, Baldus continues, is the lex Salica, providing for the agnatic 
succession to the throne.8 It is difficult to find a stronger link between subjective and 
objective meanings of dignitas.  
Dignitas, as said, does not refer only to persons, but also to offices. And the same 
dialectic between moral and legal qualities informing the personal dignitas may also 
                                                        
4 Rom. 13:1: 'non est potestas nisi a Deo; quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt'. Cf. Aquinas, Super 
Epistolas S. Pauli lectura (R. Cai ed., Taurini-Romae 1953), vol. 1, c. 13, lect. 1, § 1021, p. 190. The 
literature on the medieval reading of the Pauline passage is bountiful. As to its application to our 
subject, see for all P. Costa, Iurisdictio: semantica del potere politico nella pubblicistica medievale: 
1100-1433, Milano 1969, pp. 383-385. 
5 Different senatorial ranks depended on the importance of the highest magistracy discharged by a 
senator, so for instance a man of consular rank took precedence over a man of praetorian rank, and so 
on. Since the rank of the woman was determined by association with that of her husband, another issue 
discussed in the same text of Dig.1.9.1 (Ulp. 62 ed.) was whether a woman of consular rank should 
take precedence over a man of prefectorial rank. Ulpian was for the opposite conclusion, ‘because of 
the greater dignitas of the male sex’ (quia maior dignitas est in sexu virili). A few more of such cases 
may be found in B.W. Frier and T.A.J. McGinn (eds.), A Casebook on Roman Family Law, Oxford 
2004, pp. 97-98. On senatorial ranks (especially on the consular rank) see further F.X. Ryan, Rank and 
Participation in the Republican Senate, Stuttgart, 1998, pp. 137 ff. 
6  Baldus, ad Dig.1.9.1 § Consulari (Baldi Vbaldi Pervsini ... In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem 
Commentaria ... Venetiis [apud Iuntas], 1577, fol. 49va, n. 1): 'Dignior est vir quam foemina'. 
7  Ibid.: 'Item facit quod si patronus ecclesiae decessit superstite filio, et filia, et discordant in 
presentando quod debet preferri voc masculi tanquam dignior.' 
8 Ibid., fol. 49va, n. 2. 
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be found in the concept of office as dignitas. Going back to the 'worthier voice' of the 
man, an excellent example may be found in the text immediately following it in the 
sources. It refers to the case of a senator expelled from the senate for his unworthiness 
(ex turpitudine). This ex-senator in disgrace is not allowed to judge or give witness. 
On the basis of that text, Baldus wonders whether the supervening indignitas should 
also prevent someone from deposing as witness. 9  For being witness 'is itself a 
dignitas'.10 Depending on its owner, a voice may be worthier (dignor) than another. 
Applied to a specific legal function, the same voice becomes an office (dignitas). The 
higher dignitas of the man explains why in some countries the supreme dignitas - that 
of the Crown - is precluded to those less worthy (women). The higher the office 
(dignitas) the higher the worthiness (dignitas) needed to discharge it. Stated in more 
abstract terms, 'quality is not without a subject, and those worthier (dignores) ought to 
be preferred'.11 
If dignitas is both a personal quality, a legal requirement and an office, then - going 
back to the imagine of the worthier voice - the voice is even stronger when its 
possessor occupies an office himself. So, Baldus argues, the testimony of 'that who 
holds an office' (qui est in dignitate) is stronger than that of who does not.12 This is 
both because holding a dignitas (office) attests to the dignitas (worthiness) of its 
holder, and because the deposition is not just that of the person, but of the same 
dignitas of the office.  
On the same basis, Baldus could easily argue that 'the worthier should occupy a 
higher rank', which is in its turn determined by its closeness to the higher authority - 
in the specific case, the proconsul.13 Only the worthiest person may confer the highest 
dignities - that is, the prince (who in turn occupies the highest dignitas of all).14 The 
higher the dignitas of the office, the higher the personal dignitas that is required to 
hold it. Since the higher rank is worthier, its incumbent should possess a higher 
dignitas in moral, social and legal terms - for each of them both requires and explains 
the others. Their inner connection is made visible by the fact that the holder of a 
superior dignitas should not only be worthier (dignor), but also appear such. So, for 
example, the abbot should be dressed better than the simple monk because, as Baldus 
explains, he is worthier (dignor) than him. 15  Referred to a person, dignitas is 
ultimately a question of proportionality between moral worthiness and legal aptitude. 
When the person holds an office, the same question of proportionality arises: the 
                                                        
9 Witnesses enjoyed different degrees of attendibility according to their dignitas, so the judge had to 
assess ‘quanta fides adhibenda sit testibus, qui et cuius dignitatis et cuius existimationis sint’ (Bartolus, 
Tractatus testimoniorum, in Bartoli a Saxoferrato, Consilia, Quaestiones, & Tractatus ... Basileae, ex 
officina Episcopiana, 1588, p. 436, n. 2).  
10 Baldus, ad Dig.1.9.2 § Cassius Longinus (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), 
fol. 49vb, n. 2): 'Item testimonium est dignitas i(d est) status illaesus absque macula'. 
11  Baldus, ad Inst.1.2.12 § Omnem autem ius (Baldi Vbaldi Pervsini ... Praelectiones in quatuor 
Institutionum libros ..., Venetiis, 1577, fol. 5va, n. 1): 'Ius commune ad personas, res vel actiones 
spectat; et qualitas non est sine subiecto, et dignores praeferendi sunt'. 
12 Baldus, ad Dig.22.5.3pr, § Testium fides (Baldi Vbaldi pervsini Ivrisconsvlti ... In Secundam Digesti 
vet[eris] partem Commentaria ... Venetiis [apud Iuntas], 1577, fol. 179va, n. 1): 'magis creditur ei, qui 
est in dignitate, quam ei qui non est in dignitate'. 
13 Baldus, ad Dig.1.16.4.3, § Antequam vero (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), 
fol. 62ra, n. 3): 'dignores debent altiori loco sedere, et altior locus est, qui est domino magis 
propinquus'. 
14 Baldus, ad Dig.2.1.3, § Imperium (ibid., fol. 73ra, n. 7): 'solus Princeps confert magnas dignitates'. 
15 Baldus, ad Dig.7.1.15.2, § Sufficienter (ibid., fol. 317vb, n. 2): 'abbas debet esse melius vestitus 
quam monachus, quia dignor'. 
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personal dignitas (in both its meanings) must be commensurate to the dignitas of the 
office.  
This correspondence between inner and outer dignitas points to the symmetry 
between dignitas of the person and dignitas of the office. The point is crucial. To 
understand it, we might want to look at a paradox discussed in the Gloss, which 
clearly summed up a typical disputatio. The emperor is unworthy (indignus) of being 
a simple governor (praeses). The office of the governor is clearly below that of the 
emperor. But if the emperor is not worthy of being a governor, does that mean that he 
is even less worthy (indignor) of the empire? The answer was of course negative: it 
was the lower office of the governor to be unworthy of the person of the prince, not 
the contrary.16 But the argument used in the paradox is interesting: the incompatibility 
between lower rank of the office and higher status of the person implies that also the 
office had a dignitas, which could be described both in terms of worthiness and of 
aptitude. Baldus devotes much attention to this gloss, providing even clearer 
examples: 'the pope is not worthy (dignus) of being chaplain', just the way 'Caesar is 
not worthy (dignus) to be a decurion'. 17  These two examples capture well the 
relationship between worthiness and aptitude of the person, and their reflection on the 
office. Moral worthiness entails legal aptitude, and vice versa: the suitability to 
discharge a certain office also impacts on the moral worthiness of its holder, for it 
measures it. Fitness to a position almost quantifies moral worthiness. Pope and 
emperor would be 'overqualified' for those minor offices - and so not suited to occupy 
them. Doing otherwise would be unworthy of their dignitas: hence the association 
often found in medieval jurists between dignitas and idoneitas. 18  In a world of 
potestates ordinatae, the specific position of each person attests to a certain degree of 
personal worthiness. The dignitas of the office should be commensurate with the 
dignitas of the person that holds it. Pope and emperor are not worthy of lower offices 
because the dignitas of such offices is itself lower than that of their person - their 
moral worthiness, and so legal aptitude. Those lower offices are not able to 
accommodate the supreme dignities of pope and emperor. The term chosen by Baldus 
to signify this inability is 'non capax'. Just as 'capacity' in modern English, capax 
meant both ability and spaciousness. Just as a lower dignitas is not 'spacious' enough 
to accomodate the 'size' of the supreme dignitas, it would be unworthy of the higher 
dignitas to be 'squeezed' into a lower one.  
 
2.2. Agent and office  
                                                        
16 Gloss ad Dig.1.9.4, § Qui indignus (Pandectarvm Ivris Civilis, Parisiis, apud Gulielmum Merlin ... et 
Gulielmum Desboys ..., ac Sebastianum Niuellium ..., 1566, vol. 1, col. 120): '... Imperator indignus est 
quod sit praeses: ergo indignior imperio? Respon(deo) minores ordines sunt indigni eo: non ipse eis.' 
17 Baldus ad Dig.1.9.4, § Qui indignus (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 
50va, n. 2): 'Opponit gl(osa) Papa non est dignus esse cappellanus, ergo non est dignus esse Papa. 
Respon(deo) omnia continet sub se dignitas suprema. Vel aliter, Papa non est dignus plebanus villae 
Canalis, ergo non est dignus papatu. nam illa est falsa: quia Papa dignus est, sed villa Canalis indigna, 
nec est tanti capax. Et idem in Imperatore: nam Caesar non est dignus esse Decurio, i(d est) 
decurionatus non est dignus Caesare, nec aliqua inferior dignitas ratione proportionis digna est amplecti 
quod supremus est'. 
18 Cf. Rossi, Indignitas, Heresy and Schism (note 3), p. 151. See more broadly J. Peltzer, Idoneität. 
Eine Ordnungskategorie oder eine Frage des Rangs?, in C. Ardenna and G. Melville (eds.), Idoneität - 
Genealogie - Legitimation. Begründung und Akzeptanz von dynastischer Herrschaft im Mittelalter, 
Köln-Weimar-Wien 2015, pp. 23-37. The reverse, as usual, is true: inidoneitas also means indignitas. 
See for all E. Peters, The Shadow King. Rex Inutilis in Medieval Law and Literature, New Haven-
London 1970, esp. pp. 116-134. 
 7 
Having briefly introduced the concept of dignitas, we might now turn our attention to 
the difference between agent and office in Baldus. To do so, it is possible to 
distinguish four levels, four degrees of separation between person and office. First, 
obligations of person vs. obligations of the office. Secondly, individual offices vs. 
collegiate bodies. Thirdly, individual offices held by their lawful representative but in 
a way that is unworthy of the office's dignitas. Fourth, individual offices discharged 
by an agent that is not fully legitimate to represent them.  
 
The concept of legal person, it is well known, is largely the product of the elaboration 
of the canon lawyers,19 among whom Innocent IV had a role second to none.20 Baldus 
adapted that concept to secular matters, first and foremost to the notion of kingdom.21 
The image of the king as the guardian of the Crown is exceedingly well known. This 
image, however, is usually approached as a metaphor, not as a specific legal 
reference. Reisenberg for one famously observed how the description of the prince as 
a guardian allows to separate the 'abstraction of sovereignty' from 'its momentary 
possessor'. 22  Powerful and evocative as it is as a metaphor, however, we might 
approach that image also as a specific legal reference. Few medieval lawyers, apart 
from Cinus of Pistoia, were also great poets. In a legal discourse metaphors have legal 
consequences, for they are legal analogies. The description of the prince as guardian 
and the Crown as ward is often found in Baldus, especially in some of his more 
politically-oriented consilia. It was one of them to prompt Reisenberg's statement.23 
In that same consilium, shortly after the metaphor, Baldus looks at the passage in the 
Digest (Dig.34.9.22) where the difference between the person of the guardian and the 
quality of being guardian appears more clearly. That passage excludes the 
imputability of obligations, duties and liabilities assumed by the guardian in the 
exercise of the wardship to the guardian as a person. It is hardly fortuitous that in 
Roman law the punishment for the guardian's misconduct was precisely to lift this 
separation and impute those debts directly to the guardian as a person, condemning 
him to to pay for them out of his own pocket.  
                                                        
19 By and large, the discussion of canon lawyers focused on the corporation's decision-making process 
and on the scope (and limits) within which its representative could validly act on its behalf. On the 
subject the literature is vast. To give only a few references, the obvious starting point is the work of B. 
Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory. The Contribution of the Medieval Canonists from 
Gratian to the Great Schism, (3rd edn.) Leiden 1998, pp. 98-117, of Y. Congar, Quod omnes tangis, ab 
omnibus tractari et approbari debet, 36 (1958) Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger, pp. 
210-259, at 210-221 and 224-234, and of G. Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought, Princeton 1964, 
pp. 91-162. More recently see also K. Pennington, Representation in Medieval Canon law, 64 (2004) 
The Jurist. Studies in church law and ministry, pp. 361-383, esp. 365-375. 
20 See esp. A. Melloni, Innocenzo IV. La concezione e l'esperienza della cristianità come regimen unius 
personae, Genova 1990, pp. 101-131, where ample literature, esp. at 102-106; Id., Ecclesiologia ed 
istituzioni. Un aspetto della concezione della cristianità di Innocenzo IV, in S. Chodorow (ed.), 
Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Canon Law, Città del Vaticano 1992, 
pp. 285-307, at pp. 290-98. Cf. Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory (note 19), pp. 99-108, 
and, more recently, Walther, Die Konstruktion der juristischen Person (note 2), pp. 203-206. See also 
S. Panizo Orallo, Persona jurídica y ficción: estudio de la obra de Sinibaldo de Fieschi (Inocencio IV), 
Pamplona 1975, pp. 227-342.  
21 On the point see esp. J. Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis, Cambridge 1987; 
reprint, 1989, pp. 185-197. Most recently see also, inter multos, H. Tuner, The Corporate 
Commonwealth. Pluralism and Political Fictions in England, 1516-1651, Chicago-London 2016, pp. 
18-20, and D. Lee Popular Sovereignty in Early Modern Constitutional Thought, Oxford 2016, pp. 74-
77. 
22 P. Riesenberg, Inalienability of Sovereignty in Medieval Political Thought, New York 1956, p. 97. 
23 Baldus, cons.3.159 (Venetiis 1580), infra, note 31. 
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If there is a study on medieval political thought that is even more famous than that of 
Reisenberg, it is the work of Ernst Kantorowicz on the two bodies of the king. As an 
abstraction, the king never dies. It is the immortality of the Crown that explains (and, 
at the same time, strengthens) an otherwise bizarre custom - loudly exclaming 'the 
king is dead, long life to the king!'24 In his study, Kantorowicz gave a masterful 
description of the image of the king as phoenix in Baldus.25 Just as the emperor, there 
is only one phoenix at any given time. In the phoenix, single individual and abstract 
category coincide. This makes the metaphor even stronger: while the only living 
phoenix dies, the Phoenix does not. The strength of the metaphor makes it particularly 
appropriate to describe the relationship between king and Crown. As representative of 
the Crown, the previous individual to wear it is in no way different from the next - 
just as the new phoenix will be physically identical to the old one. The phoenix dies 
but at the same time it dies not, and so does the king.26  
After this metaphor so full of poetry, Kantowowicz moves on. But we might want to 
continue examining the passage of Baldus to see what comes next. Poetry served a 
precise purpose: it introduced a legal concept with a metaphorical analogy. 
Immediately after the image of the phoenix, Baldus goes back to business. The legal 
proceedings entrusted to the office holder pass to the next incumbent, he observes, for 
the predecessor was not given the task as an individual but as representative of his 
office.27 In their quality of representative of the office, old and new incumbent are 
precisely one and the same - just like the phoenix. If we were to leave aside political 
thought and focus on the 'legal side' of the phoenix, the question might well be: when 
the phoenix dies, does the mortgage on the nest pass on to the new bird? While 
doubtlessly suggestive, the image of the phoenix is invoked for a strictly legal 
purpose: nothing else has such perfect identity between old and new. The old phoenix 
is the new one. This identity implies full continuity, and requires to think not in terms 
                                                        
24 E. Kantorowicz, The king's two bodies. A study in mediaeval political theology, Princeton 1957; 6th 
reprint, 1981, cap. 6 and 7, esp. pp. 291-313, 318-342, and 409-413. For a detailed analysis of the 
scholarly literature dealing with this point see S. Meder, Doppelte Körper im Recht. Traditionen des 
Pluralismus zwischen staatlicher Einheit und transnationaler Vielheit, Tübingen 2015, pp. 46-47 and 
49-53. 
25 Kantorowicz, last note, pp. 388-390.  
26 Baldus, ad X.1.29.14, Quoniam abbas (Baldvs svper Decretalibvs ... Lugduni, excudebat Claudius 
Seruanius, 1564, fol. 89va, n. 2): 'Dicit ber(nardus parmensis) quod dignitas non moritur sed persona 
quia indiuidua sepe pereunt quod summis dignitatibus non est concessus'. 
27 Ibid., fol. 89vb, n. 3: 'Dicit In(nocentius) quod quando causa committitur loco vel dignitati mortuo 
commissario vel remoto transit delegatio ad ipsam dignitatem.' Cf. Innocent IV, ad X1.29.14, § 
Quoniam Abbas (Commentaria Innocentii Quarti Pont. Maximi Super Libros Quinque Decretalium, 
Francofurti ad Moenum [Martin Lechler, Sigmund Feyerabend], 1570; anastatic reprint, Frankfurt am 
Main 1968, fol. 123ra, n. 1): 'successores procederent in causa, cum sit iurisdictio penes loca et 
dignitates, et non penes personas.' Because of this reason the new incumbent is considered the same 
person as the old one. Innocent elaborated further on the point in his discussion on the dispossession of 
the right to make an appointment. When the election was made by someone other than the rightful 
elector, he could demand its annulment. If he died, the faculty to demand the annulment would pass to 
his successor, because the prejudice was done not to him as a person, but rather to the office he 
represented. Hence the successor is considered (fingitur) one and the same person with his predecessor 
('finguntur enim eodem personae cum praedecessoribus'). That, however, does not apply to collegiate 
offices, for no single member of the chapter succeeds to the previous one to the point of being 
identified with him: the identification happens only through the office, and no single member of the 
chapter represents the office ('sed in canonicis secus. Nam canonici qui substituuntur, canonicis non 
succedunt in honore et onere, sed capitulum eis succedit'). Innocent IV, ad X.1.6.28, § Propter bonum 
pacis (ibid., fol. 58vb, n. 5). See further ibid., fol. 59rb-va, n. 8-9. 
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of transfer of obligation, but in terms of agency. The immortality of the phoenix is 
immortal, precisely in the same way as the dignitas of the Crown.  
Baldus' concept of agency in (what we might anachronistically consider as) public 
law is best explained through the example of the king as agent of the Crown. To better 
appreciate the legal implications of that concept, however, the focus of our analysis 
should be more on the obligations of the office than on the abstract relationship 
between office and person. Doing so might give useful insights as to the 'mechanism' 
of representation and, especially, its limits. 
 
A classical text of Baldus on the immortality of the dignitas is his consilium on 
whether the obligation undertaken by the old king should bind his successor. Baldus 
answers drawing a distinction between obligations undertaken by the king as a person 
and obligations assumed in the name of the Crown.28 The same happens with the 
papacy, the 'supreme dignity' (dignitas suprema).29 The pope may die, says Baldus, 
but the papacy does not. In both cases the question is therefore which obligations 
incurred by the previous prince or pope are transferred to the new one.30 In this 
regard, the person of the king or pope is just the agent representing the immortal 
dignitas of the Crown or the papacy. The death of the incumbent in effect amounts 
just to the replacement of one agent with the next. Therefore, if the obligation was 
assumed by the office, the mere change in the person of the agent may not extinguish 
it. In law, there is no change in the person of the obligee: it was always the office.31  
The dignitas does not suffer. Baldus famously said as much contrasting the emperor 
Constantine, allegedly healed from leprosy by pope Sylvester I, with his imperial 
'dignitas, which does not die nor suffer'.32 The dignitas does not suffer, but neither 
can it will: volition pertains only to the physical person representing it. 33  If the 
dignitas can only will through the person of its agent, it also needs the same person to 
                                                        
28 Baldus, cons.3.159 (Consiliorvm sive Responsorvm Baldi Vbaldi Pervsini ..., Volumen Primum-
Quintum, Venetiis, apud Dominicum Nicolinum, et Socios, Venetiis, 1580, fols. 45rb-46va). See for all 
Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis (note 21), pp. 86-90. 
29 Baldus, ad Dig.1.9.4, § Qui indignus (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 
50va, n. 2). 
30 Baldus, cons.3.159 (Consiliorvm sive Responsorvm (note 28), fol. 45va, n. 3): 'imperator in persona 
mori potest: sed ipsa dignitas, seu imperium immortalis est, sicut et summus Pontifex moritur, sed 
summus Pontificatus non moritur, et ideo quae procedunt a persona, et noua fede, personalia sunt, si a 
successiua uoluntate dependent. Si autem statim transferunt secum in plenum tunc mors collatoris non 
impedit beneficium, quin duret tempore successorio.' 
31  Ibid., fol. 45vb, n. 4-5: 'in contractib(us) Regum est expressum, quod contractus transeunt ad 
successores in regno, si celebrati sunt nomine dignitatis, extra, de re iud(icata) c. abbate in prin(cipio) 
lib. 6 (VI.2.14.3), et extra de iureiur(ando) c. intellecto per Inn(ocentium) [cf. Innocent IV, ad 
X.2.24.33, § Intellecto (Commentaria Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fol. 289va)], nec mirum, quia in 
regno considerari debet dignitas, quae non moritur ... unde cum intellectu loquendo, non est mortua hic 
persona concedens, s(cilicet) ipsa reipublica regni, nam uerum est dicere, quod respublica nihil per se 
agit, tamen qui regit rempublicam, agit in uirtute reipublicae, et dignitatis sibi collatae ab ipsa 
republica. Porro duo concurrunt ut in Rege: persona, et significatio. Et ipsa significatio, quae est 
quoddam intellectuale, semper est perseuerans enigmatice, licet non corporaliter: nam licet Rex 
deficiat, quod ad rumbum, nempe loco duarum personarum Rex fungit, ut ff. de his, quib(us) ut 
indi(gnis) l. tutorum (Dig.34.9.22), et persona Regis est organum, et instrumentum illius personae 
intellectualis, et publicae.'  
32 Baldus, proemium ad Digestum Vetus (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 
3ra, n. 38): 'dignitas qua non moritur, nec patitur'. 
33 Baldus, ad Dig. 1 Const. Omnem, § 7 (Haec autem tria), ibid., fol. 5vb, n. 6: 'volunctas proprie 
attribuitur personae: sed improprie attribuitur dignitati. Et ideo si verba in dignitate non sonant, in 
dubio praesumuntur sonare in personam.' 
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act. Alone, the dignitas may not act. 34  The point might seem obvious, but it is 
important because the opposite is not true: the person can act not as representative of 
the office but as individual. The problem, as Baldus has it, is that in both cases the 
person is always the causa immediata of an act. Hence the need to distinguish 
between the cases where the office is the causa remota of the same act and where 
there is no relationship between act and office. This is why the most important 
remarks of Baldus on the difference between person and office are to be found on 
issues about succession - first of all, to the throne. Because the most efficient way to 
separate person from office is to remove the physical person from the picture, so as to 
clarify which obligations and rights should pass on to the next person representing the 
same office.35  
 
Perhaps Baldus' most quoted text on the immortality of the Crown is that - revealingly 
enough - dealing with succession to the throne: 'the dignitas does not die', so the new 
prince simply replaces the old one. Matter of fact, in that text Baldus dealt with a 
slightly different and more technical issue. He was commenting on the second of the 
two books of the Digest devoted to legacies (Dig.31). This book contained two texts, 
listed one after the other, usually commented together by medieval jurists 
(Dig.31(.1).56-7).36 The first text provided that, when the testator left a bequest to the 
emperor but the prince predeceased him, then the bequest would go to the next 
emperor.37 The second text dealt with the bequest to the Augusta (the emperor's wife) 
and stated the opposite: if the testator bequeathed something to the Augusta but she 
died before the testator, then the bequest would be void.38 The Gloss sought to explain 
the difference without any reference to representation. The Augusta does not enjoy all 
Caesar's prerogatives, so for instance she cannot legislate.39 Commenting on the same 
text, Bartolus went a step beyond: a legacy to the incumbent in office can go to the 
                                                        
34 Baldus, repetitio ad Dig.4.4.38.1, § Item quod dicitur, ibid., fol. 246rb, n. 45: 'ecclesia sine Papa 
nihil agit: ideo oportet quod per alium regatur, sicut et regitur minor.' 
35 See esp. Baldus, cons.3.121 (Consiliorvm sive Responsorvm (note 28), fol. 34ra, n. 6): 'quaedam 
sunt, quae competunt personae in dignitate, ita quod persona sit causa immediate: dignitas autem sit 
causa remota. Quaedam uero sunt, quae competunt dignitati principaliter, et quia dignitas informat 
suum subiectum competunt personae: quia dignitas sine persona nihil agit, in primis extincta persona, 
quae erat finale subiectum actus: expirat ipse actus pendens, quia persona facit locum actui ... Et ideo 
quaecunque sunt singularis fidei, et industriae, tanquam singulares animi passiones morte annihilantur 
et non transmittuntur, vnde fidem, et industriam nemo transmittit. In secundis autem, quae competunt 
dignitati per prius, et personae in dignitate positae per posterius, et per sic necesse esse, quia (ut dixi) 
iurisdictio sine persona nil agit, ut ff. de origi(ne) iur(is) l. 2 § post originem iuris (Dig.1.2.2.13). Ibi 
attendimus dignitatem tanquam principalem: et personam tanquam instrumentalem. Vnde 
fundamentum actus est ipsa dignitas, quae est perpetua, extra de offic(io iudicis) deleg(ati) c. quoniam 
abbas (X.1.29.14). Cf. ibid., cons.3.217, fol. 63va, n. 3: 'Cum persona sit assumpta loco finalis causae 
prorograndi ab alio non futuro, personalis, quae est alia in substantia hominis, et non persona idealis, 
quae est dignitas, ipsa facit locum prorogationi, et non dignitas, igitur extincta persona extinguitur 
prorogatio.' 
36 E.g. Gloss ad Dig.31(.1).56, casus ad § Quod principi (Pandectarvm Ivris Civilis (note 16), vol. 2, 
col. 901): 'Legaui imperatori, et ipse decessit ante diem legati cedentem, id est ante mortem meam: 
certe ad sequentem imperatorem transmittur. Secus autem esset in Augusta, cui legatum esset et h(oc) 
d(icit) l(ex) seq(uens) (i.e. Dig.31(.1).57). Vivianus (Tuscus).' 
37 Dig.31(.1).56 (Gaius, 14 Iul. et Pap.): 'Quod principi relictum est, qui ante, quam dies legati cedat, ab 
hominibus ereptus est, ex constitutione divi Antonini successori eius debetur.' 
38 Dig.31(.1).57 (Mauricius, 2 Iul. et Pap.): 'Si Augustae legaveris et ea inter homines esse desierit, 
deficit quod ei relictum est, sicuti divus Hadrianus in Plotinae et proxime imperator Antoninus in 
Faustinae Augustae persona constituit, cum ea ante inter homines esse desiit, quam testator decederet.' 
39 Gloss ad Dig.31(.1).56, § Si augustae (Pandectarvm Ivris Civilis (note 16), vol. 2, col. 901): '... tu 
dic eadem priuilegia, sed non omnia: nam nec legis condendae.' 
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successor if there is a direct link between person and office (as with Caesar), but not 
also when the link is only indirect (as with Caesar's wife).40 So for instance when a 
bequest is left to the bishop not as a specific person but as incumbent in office, 
Bartolus observed, then it would pass on to his successor. But the same could not 
apply to his vicar, since he is not the agent of the office but rather the agent's agent 
(that is, the agent of the representative of the bishopric).41 
In his turn, Baldus went a step beyond Bartolus. This new step, however, was a very 
significant one. The difference between Caesar and his wife is that the dignitas - in 
the sense of office - is only that of the prince. The wife of the incumbent has a 
dignitas only by association. Since the dignitas of the office does not die, the legacy 
to Caesar is always valid. As the recipient of the bequest is to be determined by 
reference to the office, which is immortal, it should go to the incumbent in office. By 
contrast, the Augusta has a dignitas only in the sense of social (and so, moral) 
standing, not also in the sense of legal representation (and so, of office). She is 
Augusta simply by association with the person of the incumbent on the throne. When 
she dies, therefore, her (personal) dignity dies too. 'Such a dignitas dies with the 
person', and a new one is created by association with the immortal office of the 
Crown: 'with a new Augusta, a new dignitas is created'.42 Thereafter Baldus recalls 
Bartolus' example of the legacy to the bishop and to his vicar, and applies the same 
rationale. Both the office of Caesar and that of the bishop, says Baldus, are immortal 
and always the same. Since the office of bishop does not die, the legacy can pass on to 
the next incumbent. By contrast, he continues, the position of the vicar is closer to 
that of the Augusta: just as a woman becomes Augusta when she marries the 
representative of the Crown, so a man becomes episcopal vicar when appointed by the 
actual representative of the bishopric.43  
This difference between person and agent may be clearly seen also in Baldus' 
comment on another text, this time of the Code (Cod.7.61.2). The text provided that 
provincial governors should refer criminal cases to the emperor only after having 
notified the parties. Commenting on this text, Baldus wondered what would happen if, 
having been consulted, the prince were to die before he could reply. Should the 
governor start the procedure anew or could the next prince just reply to the petition 
                                                        
40 Bartolus, ad Dig.31(.1).56, § Quod Principi (In Secundam Partem Infortiati Bartoli a Saxoferrato 
Commentaria ... Basileae, ex officina Episcopiana, 1588, p. 105, n. 1): 'Relictum sub nomine dignitatis, 
transit ad successorem in dignitate, si dignitate, quis habet per se: secus si per consequentiam alterius.' 
41  Ibid., n.3: 'Et sic facit ista lex, quod si relinquitur episcopo sub nomine dignitatis, transit ad 
successorem: secus si relinqueretur uicario: quia tunc non transit in sequentem uicarium.' 
42 Baldus, ad Dig.31(.1).56, § Quod Principi (Baldi Vbaldi ... In Primam et Secvn[dam] infortiati 
partem, Commentaria ... Venetiis [apud Iuntas], 1577, fol. 151vb): 'Relictum dignitati, qua quis habet 
per se, non potest effici caducum, quia dignitas non moritur: secus si relinquatur dignitati, quam quis 
habet per alium, quia talis dignitas moritur cum persona, et facit hoc ad rationem quam assignat 
tex(um) extra, de praeben(dis) c. dilecto (X.3.5.25), et no(tandum) quod in l. quod Princi(pi) 
(31(.1).56) dignitas vacat, et l. si Augusta (Dig.31(.1).57), dignitas desinit. In tex(tu) constitutiones 
tamen, non continet haec constitutio ius singulare, sed commune, quia Imperium, et dignitas semper est 
et non moritur; et facit quod no(tandum) s(upra) de pac(tis) l. tale pactum, in fi(ne) (Dig.2.14.40.3). In 
l. si Augusta (Dig.31(.1).57), Augusta non habet dignitatem ex se, sed per modum cuiusdam 
dependentiae, i(d est) accessionis, et ideo in tali dignitate non habet successorem, vnde sua dignitas 
eius morte finitur, et cum noua Augusta noua dignitas creatur.' 
43 Ibid.: 'et ideo dicit Bar(tolus) quod si relinquitur Episcopo, et Episcopus moritur, viuo testatore, quod 
debetur successori; secus, si relinquitur Vicario, et Vicarius moritur viuo testatore, quia Vicarius de 
nouo creatus non habebit istud legatum secundum Bar(tolum). Item no(tandum) in l. quod Principi 
(31(.1).56), quod legatum quod immortali relinquitur non potest effici caducum, vel quasi: vnde 
quando relinquitur pauperibus in genere, quia genus non potest perire, istud legatum non potest effici 
caducum.' 
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addressed to his predecessor? The petition was addressed to the Crown in the person 
of his representative, reasons Baldus, so it was not directed to the prince as a private 
individual. The governor therefore awaits a reply from the Crown and not from the 
person wearing it. Hence Baldus' conclusion is that the new prince may well reply to 
the petition addressed to (the Crown in) the person of his predecessor. This text of the 
Code - especially in its medieval interpretation - referred to the decisions rendered by 
the emperor in his quality of highest judge. Clearly the decision of this supreme judge 
did not depend on the personal qualities of the physical king, but from the position of 
his office, at the apex of the hierarchical jurisdictional structure. This strengthens 
Baldus' reasoning: the petition is clearly addressed to the Crown, he says, because in 
its decision it is 'impressed' the dignitas of the crown itself (illa dignitas imprimit in 
actu quam gerit).44  
Having clarified the rule, Baldus applies it to more complex cases. If the prior of the 
Dominicans was appointed as executor by the testator, but he died before being able 
to carry out the task, should the next prior do that? The Dominican prior, reasons 
Baldus, was appointed because of the dignitas of his office, 'as a person made perfect 
in Christ'. The dignitas of that position attests to the moral worthiness of its 
incumbent. So the choice did not depend on any specific quality of the individual 
person, but rather by the qualities needed to hold that office. Once again, the dignitas 
of the office attests to the dignitas of its holder. The appointment as executor may 
therefore pass on to the next prior. It would be different, adds Baldus, if the 
incumbent in office were to be appointed as arbiter. Here, he explains, the choice 
depends on considerations of personal nature. So even if the person appointed as 
arbiter were to hold an office, that would not add anything to the verdict: 'the dignitas 
would not bestow anything to the deed'. 45  Commenting on the Institutes Baldus 
expands on the point. Normally, the next incumbent in office may hear a dispute 
entrusted to his predecessor. That, however, does not apply to most arbitrations. 
Typically, explains Baldus relying on Innocent IV, the choice of the arbiter does not 
depend on the office he might represent (the appointment is not made sub nomine 
dignitatis), but on the qualities that one possesses as individual (it is made sub nomine 
proprio). So the arbitration does not pass on to the successor in office, for the 
appointment was made 'with regard to the person, not because of the office' 
(contemplatione personae, non causa dignitatis). By the same token, however, the 
opposite conclusion applies when the arbiter was chosen because of his office, not as 
a specific person. It is also possible to think of the opposite scenario: the testator 
would usually chose his executor 'with regard to his person' (contemplatione 
personae), not to any office he might hold. But if the appointment were to be made by 
                                                        
44 Baldus, ad Cod.7.61.2, § Super delictis (Baldi de Pervsio Ivrisconsvlti clarissimi, svper VII, VIII et 
Nono Codicis, commentaria luculentissima ... Lvdgvni, typis Gaspar & Melchior Trechsel, 1539, fol. 
99rb, n. 3): 'Quero si preses consuluit principem et princeps moritur an debeat expectari responsum 
successoris. Respondeo quia consultatio concernit principaliter dignitatem que non moritur vt l. quod 
principi, de leg(atis) ii (Dig.31.(1).56) licet persona sit organum ipsius dignitatis sine quo dignitas nil 
facit. ... aut tanquam dignitas non expirat aut tanquam persona in dignitate: et tunc illa dignitas 
imprimit in actu quam gerit aut demostrat cum quo geratur. Primo casu commissio est realis, secundo 
est personalis: quia prima persona est immediata causa commissionis'. 
45 Ibid.: 'Respon(deo) aut fides sumitur ratione officii vt quando testator reliquit executorem priorem 
predicatorum et transit ad successorem: ei enim committitur tanquam persone perfecte in Christo ... aut 
dignitas actu nihil confert: et tunc expirat vt in compromissa: quia compromittere est quod personale.' 
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reference to a specific office, continues Baldus, then the appointment would pass on 
to the next incumbent.46 
 
In the course of these pages, we will see how much did Baldus rely on canon lawyers. 
Together with Innocent IV, the canonist most quoted by Baldus is probably Johannes 
Andreae.47 In his comment on the title of the Liber Extra on canonical elections and 
the powers of the elected (X.1.6), Johannes Andreae wondered whether the oath to a 
plelate would be still binding even after his deposition from office. The answer of 
Johannes Andreae depended on whether the oath was made to the prelate as 
representative of the office or as a private person. Only in the second case, he 
concluded, one would be still bound by the oath.48 Building on Johannes Andreae's 
comment, Baldus wonders what would happen in the opposite case - when it is the 
                                                        
46 Baldus, ad Inst.2.16.7, § Substituitur (Praelectiones in quatuor Institutionum libros (note 11), fol. 
26rb-va, n. 2-5): '... quando est delegata aliqua causa alicui sub nomine dignitatis, quod illo defuncto 
succedat in delegatis successor, vt in c. quoniam Abbas, extra, de offic(cio) deleg(ati) (X.1.29.14) et l. 
et quia ff. de iur(isdictione) om(nium) iudi(cium) (Dig.2.1.6). Sed pone quod compromissa est causa in 
aliquem sub nomine dignitatis, et mortuus est, certum est quod si fuisset compromissa sub nomine 
proprio non transiret compromissum ad successorem in dignitate: quia compromissum arbitri morte 
finitur: vt l. diem proferre ff. de (receptis qui) arbi(trium) (Dig.4.8.27pr). Sed nunquid hoc casu 
transibit [compromissum] ad successorem? Videtur quod sic quemadmodum dicimus in legato 
ar(gumentum) dictorum iurium. Innocen(tius) in c. fin. extra de offic(io) delega(ti) [cf. Innocent IV, ad 
X.1.29.43, § Eligere, infra in this note] determinat contrarium notabiliter: nam in compromisso non 
transit aliquod vniuersale, sed vnus actus tantum; secus est in iurisdictione vbi quid vniuersale transit 
secundum eum. Pro hoc facit quod dixi super ista glo(sam) nam quotiescunque proferuntur verba 
generalia contemplatione affectionis non continetur successor in effectu, sed in proposito licet verbis 
generalibus appellatiuis causa sit compromissa hoc factum est contemplatione personae, non causa 
dignitatis, et ideo nullatenus transit ad successorem in dignitate secundum dictam declarationem dicti 
Innoc(entii) quae est vera. ... In quaestione proposita nomina dignitatis non introduxit testator, seu 
compromittens, ideo nil facit quod hic dicitur ad q(uaestiones) illas. Possumus tamen respondere quod 
ratio quare admittatur successor in dignitate est, quia executor quem dat testator succedit loco legitimi 
executoris, videlicet Episcopi, qui est legitimus executor: vt l. nulli et l. si quis ad declinandam C. de 
Episco(pis) et cle(ricis) (Cod.1.3.28 and 48(49)) quasi sub nomine dignitatis sit executor vnde 
succedens loco eius ipsius naturam sapit'.  
Baldus' entire reasoning (a rather lengthy one - this note reproduces only the most salient parts of it) 
relies heavily on Innocent's position on the same matter. The successor of the incumbent in office, the 
pope maintained, takes his place as executor so long as the testator's choice was not on the person as 
individual but as representative of the office. An obvious corollary, continued Innocent, is the need to 
look at the exact words of the appointment, so as to better understand the testator's true intention. Even 
that, however, might not suffice. So Innocent added another and more general condition: the 
appointment can pass to the next incumbent in office if it does not require specific, personal qualities. 
So for instance jurisdictional tasks do not depend on personal qualities, but on the jurisdiction that 
derives from the office itself. By contrast, he concluded, the ministry of preaching requires knowledge: 
an illiterate man cannot preach a sermon. Innocent IV, ad X.1.29.43, § Eligere (Commentaria 
Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fol. 144va, n. 3): 'Sed quaero si successor, quando est scriptum, non 
expresso nomine personae, sed dignitatis tantum, vel loci hoc possit perficere, argu(mentum) quod sic, 
supr(a) eo (titulo) quoniam abbas (X.1.29.14). Quidam respondent ad hoc, vt sciatur, quae transeant ad 
successorem inspiciendam esse conceptionem verborum, in quibus forte designabit se certam personam 
ad hoc tantum eligere, vel etiam designabitur, quod ad successorem transeat et inspicienda est inde 
facti natura primo, vel potius ministerijs, puta vtrum ministerium delegari possit communiter, et per 
alios implorari, vel non, nam si non possit communiter per alios implorari sine vlla iurisdictione, vt est 
ministerium recipiendi testes excommunicandi, vel absoluendi, transit ad successorem ... Si vero tale sit 
ministerium, quod communiter ab alijs non impleatur, sicut est praedicare crucem, vbi exigitur persona 
literata, et quae praedicet opere et sermone, et idem in ministerio iniungendi poenitentiam.' 
47 Cf. M. Bertram, Kanonisten und ihre Texte (1234 bis Mitte 14. Jh.), Leiden 2012, p. 451, note 66. 
48  Johannes Andreae, ad X.1.6.34, § Iuramentum huiusmodi (Ioannis Andreae ... In primum 
Decretalium librum Nouella Commentaria ..., Venetiis, Apud Haeredem Hieronymi Scoti, 1612, fol. 
108vb, n. 38). 
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prelate to swear an oath. If the prelate swears an oath to pay something in the name of 
his office and then he is deposed from it, is he still bound by his oath? To answer the 
question Baldus applies the same logic as Johannes Andreae: if the oath was tendered 
'not as himself in his own person, but as someone else in the person of the church', 
then the prelate is no longer bound by his oath. To argue as much, Baldus recalls the 
prohibition to enforce a judgment against the guardian (curator) of the insane after the 
death of the insane person (Dig.26.9.5pr). Just as the ex-guardian, reasons Baldus, the 
prelate is no longer bound because he has ceased to represent the office for which he 
previously swore the oath. The solution of course would be the opposite, he 
continues, if the prelate incurred in the debt not 'for the utility or necessity of the 
church, but for his own business'. 49  What is particularly interesting in Baldus' 
reasoning is the description of how the obligation for the office is undertaken by the 
agent. When the prelate tenders his oath for the church, says Baldus, it is not the 
person of the prelate to do so: the prelate acts 'as someone else' (tamquam alius). This 
explains the relationship with the case of the ex-guardian. After the death of the 
insane, the guardianship is extinguished, so it is not possible to enforce a judgment 
against the guardian. The guardian, reasons Baldus, exists no longer. What is left is 
only the individual who used to exercise that role. And so this individual is liable only 
for his own obligations. 
 
2.3. Collegiate bodies and possessory issues. 
The relationship between king and Crown is ultimately the same as that between 
church and prelate: 'the church may do nothing without the prelate, nor the prelate can 
do anything without the church'.50 Instead of the metaphors of the phoenix and the 
wardship, here Baldus opts for the ecclesiological concept of mystical body. The 
prelate, becoming one thing with the church, is the 'true soul' (vera anima) directing 
the 'true body' (verum corpus) of the church.51 Despite the ecclesiological context, 
also this metaphor serves a practical and legally-minded purpose - explaining the 
concept of agency. Between Crown and church, however, there is an important 
difference: many ecclesiastical dignities are not individual offices. Proper 
representation occurs only when the office is represented by a single person. The 
bishop is a typical example: whenever the bishop exercises his jurisdictional powers, 
he does so not as an individual person, but as the representative of the episcopal 
dignitas.52  Looking at the bishop as the representative of the individual office is 
                                                        
49 Baldus, ad X.1.6.34, § Venerabilem (Baldvs svper Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 65vb, n. 14): 'Quero 
prelatus nomine prelature iurauit aliquid soluere debere tandem vitio suo depositus est ab officio, vel 
renuntiauit in manibus superioris, vtrum sit liberatus a vinculo iuramenti, dicit Io(hannis) an(dreae) 
quod sic, quia non iurauit tanquam ipse in propria persona, sed tanquam alius in persona ecclesie (cf. 
supra, note 48), ff. quando ex facto tutorum, <l.> vel post mortem (Dig.26.9.5), quod verum est si 
debitum erat contractum pro vtilitate vel necessitate ecclesie secus si pro negotiis proprijs.' 
50 Baldus, ad X.2.13.5, § Item cum quis (ibid., fol. 150ra, n. 5): 'Ultimo no(tatur) quod ecclesia sine 
prelato nihil agit nec prelatus sine ecclesia sicut tutor onerarius non habens administrationem, vt ff. de 
sol(utionibus) l. quod si forte § i (Dig.46.3.14.1)'. 
51 Ibid.: 'Et his apparet quod ecclesia et prelatus sunt vnum corpus misticum sicut verum corpus et vera 
anima ipsius sunt vnum quid naturale.' Cf. Meder, Doppelte Körper im Recht (note 24), pp. 44-46. 
52 Baldus, ad Cod.3.34.2, § Si aquam (Baldi de Pervsio ... svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio Codicis 
commentaria luculentissima ... Lvdgvni [typis Gaspar & Melchior Trechsel], 1539, fol. 217vb, n. 53): 
'Sed pone quod episcopus vtatur iurisdictioni episcopali: quero an dicatur in episcopali possesione sine 
ecclesia uel persona. Dicit Inno(centius) quod ecclesia, quia is possidet cuius nomine possidetur, vt 
no(tat) Inno(centius) de reli(giosis) do(mibus) c. cum dilectus (X.3.36.8) [cf. infra, note 121]. Intellige 
quod non possidet persona, s(cilicet) nomine suo proposita; sed si nomine appellatiuo possidet, bene 
possidet.'   
 15 
particularly useful because of the contrast with the cathedral chapter (capitulum) that 
elects him. While the episcopal dignitas is an individual office, the cathedral chapter 
is a collegiate body. This means that no single individual within it can alone be 
considered as its legal representative. Volition, we have seen, does not pertain to the 
office but to its physical representative. 53  When this representative consists of a 
plurality of individuals, however, the link between the will of such individuals and 
that of the office is only indirect. The will of any single individual does not translate 
directly in the volition of the office.  
The difference in the formation of the will of individual and collegiate offices was 
amply discussed by Innocent IV, who often referred to the cathedral chapter so as to 
highlight the contrast with the bishop.54 Baldus elaborates on the subject especially on 
issues of possession of incorporeals. Since it is not possible to take possession of what 
lacks a corporeal dimension, the usual way to lose a servitude in Roman law was just 
not using it. Some servitudes, the negative servitudes, were however not meant to be 
used. A negative servitude was lost through passive acceptance of a behaviour 
incompatible with the servitude itself. Letting the neighbour build up without doing 
anything for a sufficient length of time, for instance, results in the loss of the right of 
view. Could the right of election be lost in the same way? Barring servitudes, a right 
is not lost by simple non use. But, on a practical level, the possession of that right 
might. Therefore, asks Baldus, when an appointment is made by someone who has no 
right to do so, does the inertia of the person who has that right lead to the loss of the 
possession of the right? The answer, explains Baldus after Innocent IV,55 depends on 
the nature of the office. If the person who does not oppose the usurpation of the right 
is the representative of an individual office, then his inertia would lead to the office 
losing possession of that right. If on the contrary the same person does not represent 
the office by himself, but is just one of several individuals contributing to the 
formation of the office's will (and so, if the office is a collegiate one, such as the 
chapter), then the office does not lose possession. The reason, explains Baldus, is that 
in a collegiate office those who make the election act 'as a chapter' (ut capitulum), not 
'as single individuals' (ut singuli). The collegiate nature of the office, in other words, 
does not allow to ascribe the inertia of any single individual to the office itself.56 Later 
on, in his comment on the Liber Extra (significantly enough, written during the Great 
                                                        
53 Supra, § 2.2, text and note 33. 
54 E.g. Innocent IV, ad X.1.4.8, § Suspensus (Commentaria Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fol. 34rb, n. 5). 
55 Innocent IV, ad X.1.6.24, § Qvaerelam (ibid., fol. 54vb, n. 3): 'Et not(atur) quod licet per vnum 
annum, vel plures ego omiserim ex causa petere debitam pensionem, vel si vna vice omisi interesse 
electioni, non propter hoc amitto possessionem, quae sine animo non amittitur, sed quando petam 
pensionem, si denegetur, tunc amitto possessionem, argu(mentum) C. de ser(vitutibus) et aqua l. 
fin(alis) (Cod.3.34.14) et tunc possum vti interdicto recuperandae possessionis ... Et hoc verum est, 
quando sum in possessione interessendi electioni, sed secus esset si essem in possessione, quod solus 
eligerem, quia tunc si alius eligat, et pro electo habeatur a subditis bene amitto possessionem, quia non 
videor habere animum retinendi possessionem, cum electum ab alio patiar vti dignitate sua, sed cum 
debeo interesse electioni electio, non fit nomine cuiuslibet canonici singulariter, sed nomine capituli, et 
ideo non priuatur possessione ille qui condemnit et qui non interest, quia capitulum quod est in 
possessione eligendi, non priuatur possessione eligendi, nec etiam ille, qui non interest, quia ille non 
suo nomine hoc ius possidebat, sed capituli' (emphasis added). 
56 Baldus, ad Cod.3.34.2, § Si aquam (svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio Codicis (note 52), fol. 117rb, n. 
42): 'Queritur an negligens perdiderit possessionem. Sol(utio), secundum Innoc(entium) aut electio erat 
penes capitulum aut penes istum negligentem tanquam penes singularem personam. Primo casu aut 
eodem iure spectabat electio ad omnes, et tunc non perditur possessio. Et ratio est ista: quia ille potest 
perdere possessionem qui eam haberet; sed iste non habet possessionem, sed capitulum: ergo eam 
perdere non potest. Capitulum vero eam retinet: quia eligentes eligent vt capitulum, non vt singuli.'    
 16 
Schism)57 Baldus applies the same reasoning to the cardinals' possession of the right 
to elect the pope. That right does not pertain to any single cardinal: they hold it for the 
universal Church. So, Baldus concludes, even if they were to lose possession of that 
right, the Church would still retain it.58 
The same rationale can be applied to less dramatic but still legally relevant possessory 
issues. In order to recover possession of his office, wonders Baldus, should the prelate 
act in his own name or in the name of the office he still represents, but no longer 
possesses? Building again on Innocent IV, Baldus argues that the prelate might well 
act in either capacity - as a private individual or as the lawful representative of the 
office. The difference is only procedural. Acting as individual would be easier, for the 
prelate should only prove the dispossession. Acting as the representative of the office, 
while possible, would be more complex, since the prelate should prove his right to 
represent the office first.59  
 
2.4. Agent versus Office 
The most original contribution of Baldus to the canonists' approach (especially of 
Innocent IV) on agency in a (proto-)public law dimension is to be found not on 
collegiate offices but on individual ones: the inner limits of the validity of the agent's 
commands. This is also why the present contribution started with the description of 
officium in terms of dignitas: as we have seen, the double meaning of dignitas - moral 
and legal - applies both to the person holding the office and to the office itself. The 
office at the same time is a dignitas and has a dignitas: it is both a subject different 
from that of its representative, and it embodies certain moral values. So for instance 
the dignitas of the papacy is supreme not just because placed at the apex of the 
jurisdictional pyramid of the whole Church, but also because it embodies the 
Christian values in their higest degree. This supreme moral worthiness in turn justifies 
                                                        
57 Baldus wrote his commentary on the Liber Extra (rather, on half of it - the first two books and the 
beginning of the third) in the last decade of the fourteenth century: see esp. V. Colli, Le opere di Baldo. 
Dal codice d'autore all'edizione a stampa, in C. Frova, M.G. Nico Ottaviani, S. Zucchini (eds.), VI 
Centenario della Morte di Bado degli Ubaldi, Perugia 2005, pp. 25-85, at 77-79. Cf. Canning, The 
Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis (note 21), p. 9, note 30. 
58 Baldus, ad X.1.3.25, § Olim ex literis (Baldvs svper Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 38ra, n. 21): 'sive per 
veros cardinales sive per falsos papa eligatur ecclesia semper retinet possessionem vt l. quesitum [sed l. 
Qui fundum] ff. quemadmodum ser(vitudes) amit(tuntur) (Dig.8.6.12), nec potest ecclesia vniuersalis 
desinere possidere quia non potest expelli. Ita quia in iuribus incorporalibus nemo mero iure eiicitur vt 
ff. de vsu(rpationibus) l. sequitur § si viam (Dig.41.3.4.26), et si expellerentur cardinales tamen quia 
ipsi non possident nomine suo sed nomine totius catholice ecclesie ipsa vniuersalis ecclesia non perdit 
possessionem eligendi.' Cf. Tierney, Foundations of the Conciliar Theory (note 19), p. 195; M. Wilks, 
The Problem of Sovereignty in the Later Middle Ages, Cambridge 1963, p. 511, note 5. 
59 Baldus, ad Cod.3.34.2, § Si aquam (svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio Codicis (note 52), fol. 218ra, n. 
60-62): 'Item queritur an prelatus expulsus aget interdicto recuperande possessionis vel ex canone 
reintegranda suo nomine an nomine dignitatis. Respondeo: restitutione possessionis prelature et iuris 
episcopale et generaliter et in genere petit suo nomine: sed restitutione fundi vel domus petit nomine 
ecclesie. Officium enim est proprium persone ipsius; res autem et possessio iterum est ecclesie non 
persone, vt in c. <in> literis (X.2.13.5) per Inno(centium). Iuxta hoc queritur an prelatus suo nomine 
habeat aliquam possessionem rerum ecclesie. Dicit Inno(centius) quod suo nomine habet naturalem sed 
nomine ecclesie habet naturalem et ciuilem in d. c. in literis (X.2.13.5) [cf. Innocent IV, ad X.2.13.5, § 
Prius (Commentaria Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fol. 228ra-b, n. 8)], ergo duo possident naturaliter 
s(cilicet) prelatus et ecclesia quod est impossibile. Item si prelatus suo nomine possidet, ergo suo 
nomine agit quod s(upra) ipse negasse videtur, sed respondet utroque modo potest agere, sed consultius 
facit agere nomine proprio: quia si ageret nomine ecclesie haberet necesse se probare canonicum vel 
prelatum esse nec sufficieret sibi esse in possessione ... Sed si agit nomine suo sufficit sibi probare de 
nuda possessione secundum Inn(ocentium). Aperte dicit ergo hic Innoc(entius) quod agenti nomine 
ecclesie non sufficit probare de possessione: sed debet probare de canonica installatione'. 
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the exercise of the highest degree of jurisdiction. The same can be said for the 
dignitas of the (imperial) Crown.  
While complementing each other, the moral and legal meanings of dignitas are 
different, hence they can be separated (at least in part). The typical example in canon 
law is that of the insane bishop. The mentally ill bishop cannot be forced to resign 
from his dignitas, but he may be deprived of its exercise because of his incapacity.60 
Clearly the problem here is only of dignitas in the sense of aptitude, not also of 
worthiness - the bishop continues to be worthy of the episcopate, but no longer fit to 
exercise it. The separation between the two faces of the personal dignitas entails a 
corresponding division with regard to the office. Remaining nominally the head of the 
diocese, the bishop retains the dignitas of his office, says Baldus, but he would lose 
the (legal) power to act for it.61 This way, it is possible to keep the symmetry between 
the dignitas of person and that of the office. The bishop remains morally worthy, but 
he is now legally unfit. So he is still worth of the dignitas of his office, but unable to 
exercise it. 
We have previously seen how Baldus distinguished the obligations undertaken by the 
person as individual from those assumed as agent of the office. Coupling this 
distinction with the symmetry between dignitas of the person and of the office, it is 
possible to envisage a further degree of separation between agent and office in the 
thought of Baldus, which is not to be found in Innocent IV and most other canon 
lawyers. When the king goes against the dignitas of his office, says Baldus, his 
actions are void. 
To make sense of this statement, we should think again of the image of the king as 
custodian of the Crown. The separation between person and office allowed the 
distinction between obligations of the king as a person and obligations of the Crown 
undertaken by the king as its representative. The full separation between agent and 
office also allows to think of a thornier issue: the validity of any deed made by the 
king against the Crown. On the point, the most important canon law source is 
probably Honorius III's decretal intellecto (X.2.24.33), quoted by Baldus when 
distinguishing between obligations of the person and of the Crown.62 As it is well 
known, the decretal absolved the king of Hungary from his oath to keep the previous 
alienations of the Crown's rights.63  According to Honorius III, the oath could be 
                                                        
60 D.7 q.1 c.14. On the point see most recently B. Parlopiano, Propter deformitatem: Towards a 
Concept of Disability in Medieval Canon Law, 4 (2015) Canadian Journal of Disability Studies, pp. 
73-102, at 96-98, text and notes. 
61 Baldus, ad Dig.26.5.8.1, § Si praetor (In Primam et Secvn[dam] infortiati partem (note 42), fol. 
29rb): 'Furor vel dementia superueniens non tollit dignitatem, sed administrationem sic. H(oc) d(icit) in 
tex(to) 'momenti': per hunc § determinatur quod si Episcopus fiat furiosus, licet remanet Episcopus, 
non potest conferre praebendam quasi propter furorem sit priuatus exercitio dignitatis.' Cf. Dig.26.5.8.1 
(Ulp. 8 de omn. trib.): '... quamvis enim praetor vel praeses sit nec furor ei magistratum abroget, 
attamen datio nullius erit momenti.' 
62 Supra, note 31. 
63 The literature on the decretal Intellecto is vast, but mention should be made at least of the classical 
work of Riesenberg, Inalienability of Sovereignty (note 22), pp. 48-58 and, more in detail, 113-144 and 
161-175, together with that of Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought (note 19), pp. 393-401 (where, 
importantly, the author refers the inalienability clause to the dignitas of the kingdom). For a more 
specific focus on the decretal studied against the background of the relationship between the Hungarian 
Crown and the papacy see in particular J. Sweeney, The Problem of Inalienability in Innocent III's 
Correspondence with Hungary: A Contribution to the Study of the Genesis of "Intellecto", 37 (1975) 
Medieval Studies, pp. 235-251, and, more recently, K. Štulrajterová, The Non-alienation Clause in the 
Hungarian and English Coronation Oaths: A Justified or Unjustified Papal Assumption? 29 (2011) 
Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law, pp. 219-250, where ample literature. 
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disregarded because incompatible with another oath already sworn by the same king: 
the crowning oath, with its undertaking to preserve the rights of the Crown.64 It is on 
the basis of this decretal that Baldus construes the distinction between valid and 
invalid commands of the king.  
To that purpose, Baldus moves from natural law: the orders of the (person of the) king 
detracting from the dignitas of the Crown are void because 'against natural law' 
(contra ius naturale). It follows that the king may not order a subject to sacrifice his 
life for nothing, for that would go against natural self-preservation. Much on the 
contrary, the same command is valid when its purpose is to preserve the safety of the 
kingdom.65 The reference to natural law seems to point to the progressive emergence 
of natural law principles as an inner constraint to the power of the ruler.66 While this 
is certainly true, we should not consider that as the sole basis for Baldus' conclusion. 
There is something else in his argument, which risks being overshadowed by our 
                                                        
64 X.2.24.33: 'Intellecto iamdudum, quod carissimus in Christo filius noster Hungariae rex illustris 
alienationes quasdam fecerit in praeiudicium regni sui et contra regis honorem, nos, super hoc 
affectione paterna consulere cupientes, eidem regi dirigimus scripta nostra, ut alienationes praedictas, 
non obstante iuramento, si quod fecit de non revocandis eisdem, studeat revocare, quia, quum teneatur, 
et in sua coronatione iuraverit etiam, iura regni sui et honorem coronae illibata servare, illicitum 
profecto fuit, si praestitit de non revocandis alienationibus huiusmodi iuramentum, et propterea penitus 
non servandum.' 
65 Baldus, cons.3.159 (Consiliorvm sive Responsorvm (note 28), fol. 46rb, n. 7-8): '... dumtamen non 
faciat aliquid, per quod minuatur honor coronae, uel status Regni, ut extra de iureiu(rando) c. intellecto 
(X.2.24.33) et ex hoc sequitur, quod donatio facta Titio militi ualuit. Secundo, praemittendum est, quod 
praeceptum Regis est seruandum, dum tamen sit iustum, uel saltem non iniustum. Unde si Rex 
praeciperet subdito suo, quod interficeret seipsum, uel iret ad locum, in quo trucidaretur ab hoste, uel 
mitteret filium suum ad uictimam, in hoc non est parendum Regi: quia talia mandata sunt contra ius 
naturale. Sed si mandat alicui, quod defendat patriam, et honorem Regis, etiam si hoc non posset fieri 
sine periculo, parendum est Regi: quia hoc ius regni erit etc. ... Per hoc reuertor ad propositum, si Rex 
mandauit, quod miteret filium suum per obside, unus Christianus in manus saracenorum, uel crudelis 
tyranni, non ualeret mandatum: ut l. ut uim, ff. de iust(itia) et iu(re) (Dig.1.1.3) et ff. de cap(tivis) et 
<de> postl(iminio) reuer(tis) (sic), l. postliminium § filius (Dig.49.15.19.7), et totum hoc redigendum 
est ad arbitrium boni uiri; et per hoc apparet, utrum illi praecepto de mittendo filium in obsidem 
debuerit parere, uel non, ar(gumentum) ff. quod me(tus) ca(usa) l. isti quidem in fi(ne) (Dig.4.2.8.3).' 
While the reference to Dig.1.1.3 was fairly obvious, that to a text as specific as Dig.49.15.19.7 was 
probably dictated by the comment in the Gloss, which linked patria potestas with natural affection - 
and so it made easy (for a later jurist) the connection with natural law. Cf. Gloss ad Dig.49.15.19.7 § 
Charitas (Pandectarvm Ivris Civilis (note 16), vol. 3, col. 1673): 'id est patria potestas, quae fuit 
inducta propter affectionem liberorum iure ciuili Romanorum'.  
A similar position, although less elaborate, may be found in some passages of Baldus on the Liber 
Extra, especially ad X.2.19.9 (Baldvs svper Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 170va, n. 7): 'non tamen posset 
imperator donare claues imperii, sicut ille qui tenet claues portarum tenetur eas resignare successori, 
alias potest dici proditor vt no(tatur) C. de acq(uirenda) pos(sessione) l. fi(nalis) (Cod.7.32.12), ff. de 
le(gats) ii. l. cum pater § pat(er) pluribus (Dig.31(.1).77.21). Item non potest viscera imperii euiscerare: 
quia esset homicida sue dignitatis'. The text is translated in English by Canning, The Political Thought 
of Baldus de Ubaldis (note 21), p. 87. Somewhat surprisingly, Baldus' comment on the decretal 
Intellecto itself is not particularly useful to our purposes, apart from its opening words: 'Rex debet esse 
tutor regni non depopulator nec dilapidator' (Baldus, ad X.2.24.33, Baldvs svper Decretalibvs (note 
26), fol. 214va, n. 1). See also cons.1.271 (Consiliorvm sive Responsorvm (note 28), fol. 81vb, n. 3), on 
the relationship between prince and fisc. Cf. Kantorowicz, The king's two bodies (note 24), p. 184; 
Riesenberg, Inalienability of Sovereignty (note 22), p. 18, note 31, and p. 150, note 13; Post, note 19, 
pp. 345 and 388, note 51; J. Wahl, Immortality and inalienability: Baldus de Ubaldis, 32 (1970) 
Mediaeval Studies, pp. 308-328, at 320-324; Canning, The Political Thought of Baldus de Ubaldis 
(note 21), p. 216, note 38. 
66 For the application of this concept in Baldus see e.g. K. Pennington, The Prince and the Law. 
Sovereignty and Rights in the Western Legal Tradition, Berkeley-Los Angeles-Oxford 1993, pp. 207-
210. 
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modern tendency to highlight natural law references in the medieval legal discourse: 
the dialectic agent-office. The command of the agent is void because it cannot 
possibly be imputed to the office he represents. So it remains the simple volition of a 
person who, as individual, has no authority over the commonwealth. In other words, 
the king is the 'highest agent' (procurator maximus), chosen for his qualities: his 
higher dignitas, as moral worthiness, makes him especially suitable (dignus) to that 
role.67 But he is still an agent, therefore subjected to the same legal mechanism as any 
other kind of agency. Just as any other agent, the king's jurisdiction derives from the 
right to discharge his office. When his volition cannot be imputed to the office, the 
command is void. After all, as Baldus puts it elsewhere, it is the king who is 'bound to 
his office', not the office to the king.68 
The assessment of the validity or invalidity of the ruler's command, therefore, is not 
(directly) based on moral judgments, but on legal representation. The proportionality 
of the dignitas of the agent to that of its office works as a constraint to the actions of 
the agent. Ascribing specific features to the office means distinguishing it from the 
agent. The more pronounced are such features, the stronger becomes that distinction. 
At this point, the principle of non-contradiction comes into play: the office cannot act 
against itself. The the will of the agent, we have seen, is the causa immediata of the 
act. When this causa immediata would lead the office to act against itself, the agent's 
volition may not be ascribed - as causa remota - to the office. The office has its own 
dignitas, in both its moral and legal senses, distinguished from that of the agent. The 
order of the king that would detract from the dignitas of his office cannot therefore be 
ascribed to the office itself. In such a case, the king may not be said to act as 
representative of the royal dignitas, but only as a private individual.  
To better explain the point, Baldus recurred again to the ward-guardian relationship: 
the king is the warden of the Crown. This time we might better appreciate the parallel,  
for it postulates the full separability between the two parties. The guardian should act 
in the interest of the ward, but what happens when the act of the guardian goes against 
the ward? Baldus gives the most extreme case (which in effect is the easiest to solve): 
the guardian cannot kill the ward. In the same way, the prince may not be 'the 
murderer of his dignitas' (homicida suae dignitatis).69 Here again, the metaphor is a 
legal analogy. When the guardian is clearly acting not in the interest of the ward but 
against it, then he is not acting in his capacity of guardian. The same applies to 
ecclesiastical offices: the prelate who acts in the name of the church that he represents 
is not allowed to cause harm to her.70 What is interesting is not the moral prescription 
but the legal sanction: acting against the church, the acts of the prelate are void. The 
                                                        
67  Baldus, cons.1.327 (Consiliorvm sive Responsorvm (note 28), fol. 101vb, n. 7): 'Imperator est 
procurator maximus, tamen non est proprietatis imperii dominus, sed potius officialis ex eius electa 
industria, vt ff. de curatore furiosi, l. cuius bonis (Dig.27.10.9).' The lex Cuius bonis explained that the 
heir of the curator should not succeed him because he might not be suitable for the role. Cf. 
Dig.27.10.9 (Nerat. 1 membr.): '... Nam et tunc ex integro alius curator faciendus est neque heres 
prioris curatoris onerandus, cum accidere possit, ut negotio vel propter sexus vel propter aetatis 
infirmitatem vel propter dignitatem maiorem minoremve, quam in priore curatore spectata erat, habilis 
non sit'. In recalling that lex in the present discussion, Baldus highlighs the role of the prince as 
procurator as opposed to dominus: he is elected to the office because he does possess the required 
qualities, not because he is entitled to it.  
68 Baldus, ad X.2.24.33, § Intellecto (Baldvs svper Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 214vb, n. 5): 'Imperator 
rei sue potest dare legem quam vult et non obligatur homini sed deo et dignitati sue, que perpetua est.'  
69 Ibid., ad X.2.19.9, supra, note 65. 
70 See e.g. Baldus, ad Cod.3.34.2, § Si aquam (svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio Codicis (note 52), fol. 
218va, n. 73): '... si [praelatus] contraxerit nomine ecclesie vel dignitatis cum ius sit quesitum ecclesie 
non potest preiudicare ecclesie'. 
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interest lies in that the invalidity of the deed has nothing to do with the validity of the 
agency. The underlying agency relationship is valid, but the ensuing act is void.  
 
 
3. Towards the external relevance of invalid agency  
So far, we have looked at the cases where the agent is the true representative of the 
office. We have seen the difference between agent and office, and that between 
person acting qua individual and qua agent. We have also observed how, denying to 
the person the faculty of acting qua agent to the detriment of the dignitas of the office, 
Baldus held void the acts of the lawful agent when made against the office. We 
should now proceed to examine a further and last degree in the separation between 
person and office. What happens when the agent itself is only apparently legitimated 
represent the office?  
 
3.1. Agency and toleration of the unworthy agent 
As it often happens with Baldus, the starting point is, once again, the thought of 
Innocent IV. The pope allowed the unworthy agent who was not (or no longer) in a 
position to lawfully represent the office to continue exercising it validly on the basis 
of the concept of jurisdictional toleration. At the core of this concept, elaborated by 
Innocent himself, lay the difference between person qua individual and qua 
representative of the office. The agent could still act as representative of the office 
despite the personal unworthiness (the lack of dignitas in its ethical meaning) because 
of the functional identification between person and office. In other words, the focus is 
entirely on the office, not on the person. No matter how unworthy the person may be, 
his acts are valid because they are done by the office - not by the private person that 
represents it unworthily. Hence the idea of toleration: 'anything is tolerated because of 
the office that one administers', says Innocent IV. 71 Left on the margin, the person 
qua individual is neither fully approved of (for he is unworthy and so indignus), nor 
wholly rejected (lest the agency link would be severed). Toleration lies mid-way: 
despite the wanting condition of the (person qua) individual, the (person qua) agent 
can continue to represent the office validly.72 Clearly it is possible to focus on the 
lawful agent and tolerate the unworthy person only so long as the unworthiness does 
not become manifest. The agent produces the volition of the office, but such a volition 
is expressed outwardly - and so, towards third parties. If the condition of the person 
(qua individual) were to be known to all those thirds, then it would no longer be 
possible to continue focusing only on the status of agent and ignore the quality of the 
individual.73  
Innocent IV allowed tolerating the unworthy in his office, but under a condition that 
knew no exception: anyone elected to an office should be confirmed in it by the 
superior authority first. Only then - and so long as this confirmation is not withdrawn 
- could the agent represent the office.74 It follows that the deposition from office does 
not allow tolerating the unworthy agent any longer.75  
                                                        
71 Innocent IV, ad X.5.1.24, § Et famam (Commentaria Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fol. 495vb, n. 10): 
'... omnia enim tolerantur propter officium, quod administrat.' 
72 The point is far more complex: a better approximation in G. Rossi, Representation and Ostensible 
Authority in Medieval Learned Law, forthcoming in Studien zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte. 
73 E.g. Innocent IV, ad X.3.2.7, § Operis (Commentaria Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fols. 349vb-350ra, 
n. 2). 
74 Ibid. Cf. esp. Innocent IV, ad X.5.27.10, § Irritanda (ibid., fol. 522rb): 
75 Innocent IV, ad X.5.1.24, § Et famam (ibid., fols. 495vb-496ra, n. 10): ‘… nisi esset in eum lata 
sententia depositionis, vel spoliatus esset insignibus dignitatis, tunc enim sententia a tali praelato lata, 
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The requisite of confirmation of course applies to any office, and it is not just referred 
to the case of the unworthy and so of toleration. But with regard to toleration it 
acquires a special importance, because it better explains the working of the concept of 
toleration in terms of dignitas.76 Stressing the dignitas of the office, it is possible to 
overlook the indignitas of that who occupies it, so long as that indignitas remains 
occult. The apparent contradiction of the indignus enjoying a dignitas in fact attests to 
the crucial importance of confirmation, and explains its link with the concept of 
toleration. The indignus could hold a dignitas and exercise the office because 
someone worthier (dignor) than him allowed as much by confirming him in that 
office. This way, the requirement of confirmation by the superior authority shifts the 
focus from the indignitas of the person confirmed to the superior dignitas of that who 
confirmed him. Limiting the scope of toleration only to the indignitas that is not 
manifest - and so, that remains occult - is deeply related to this shift of focus towards 
the higher dignitas of the superior authority, because only the latter is manifest. The 
occult indignitas of the individual is therefore contrasted with the manifest dignitas of 
the person who confirmed him in office. This contrast ultimately highlights the 
distinction between person qua individual and person qua agent. Confirmation in 
office provides a legal basis for this distinction and strengthens the opposition 
between hidden moral unworthiness and visible legal capacity. The defect in the 
individual is hidden, the approbation of the agent by the superior dignitas (i.e. his 
confirmation in office by that who holds a higher office) is manifest. In bestowing 
jurisdiction upon the agent, confirmation does not heal his hidden unworthiness as a 
person. This way it shifts the accent from the person to the agent. So long as the 
defect remains occult, the person continues to validly exercise the office, because the 
functional identification between person and office allows to focus exclusively on the 
agent of the office and not on the person of the agent. Only the notoriety of the crimes 
of the individual or - even more - his judicial deposition from the office may therefore 
separate agent from office. 
 
Coupling the central role of confirmation by the superior authority with the shift of 
focus from individual to agent (and so, from the person to the office) had another 
consequence. For Innocent IV, the capacity to validly represent the office towards 
third parties (external validity of agency) would strictly depend on the right to sit in 
the same office (internal validity of agency). For the pope there is full symmetry 
between internal and external validity of agency: the office acts validly towards the 
thirds when (and if) the agent acts validly towards the office (i.e. so long as he can 
validly represent it). In general terms, this would of course appear quite obvious. But 
Innocent IV did not like carving out exceptions to the rules, especially when that 
could weaken their rationale. For him, the symmetry between internal and external 
validity of agency knew no exception.77 
Innocent's insistence on the point is best appreciated if seen through the shift in the 
interpretation of the nature of individual offices: no longer specific powers vested in 
                                                                                                                                                              
non tenet ff. de his qui no(tantur) infam(ia) l. secunda § igitur (rectius, § ignominiae, Dig.3.2.2.2) ff. de 
iudi(ciis) <l.> cum praetor (Dig.5.1.12pr) nec potest dici, quod toleretur, sed intrusus dicitur. Credimus 
tamen, quod ex quo sententia de aliquo crimine lata est contra aliquem sive criminaliter, sive civiliter 
agitur, quod episcopus vel praelatus suus potest eum spoliare beneficiis, quod sub eo habet, 2. q.1. <c.> 
multi (C.2, q.1, c.18) tamen debet eum vocare, et contra eum sententiam ferre, si invenietur, et si non 
inveniatur, eodem modo damnabit eum, quia notorum est crimen per sententiam'.  
76 Cf. e.g. Innocent IV, ad X.1.6.44, § Administrent (ibid., fol. 75ra, n. 3). 
77 See esp. Innocent IV's elaborated comment § Administrent in his reading of X.1.6.44 (ibid., fol. 
75ra-b, n. 4), and of X.2.13.5, § In literis (ibid., fols. 226vb-227ra, n. 3). 
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the individual person elected or appointed to an office (as it was usual), but a legal 
subject different from the individual called to represent it. The first way of qualifying 
the individual office, focusing on the individual, led to the implicit flattening of the 
office on the person. Hence the great difficulty (or rather, legal impossibility) of many 
previous canon lawyers to tolerate the unworthy in office. What Innocent IV did was 
precisely the opposite: flattening the person (qua agent) on the office. This made 
possible tolerating the unworthy, because the accent was no longer not on the 
individual but exclusively on the agent of the office. Focusing on the agent and not on 
the individual opened the way to new and fertile legal approaches. But it also imposed 
a rigorous and necessary symmetry between internal and external sides of agency.78 
 
3.2. Agency and possession of the office 
While building on Innocent IV, Baldus is able to avoid his strict symmetry between 
the two sides of agency, allowing for it external validity (on certain conditions) 
despite the weakness of its internal side. Innocent relied exclusively on full 
entitlement to an office. Baldus highlights more the concept of possession of office.  
Possession is a very malleable legal concept, far more flexible than the black-and-
white concept of right. Innocent was not fond of ambiguities: any 'grey area' in the 
law ought to be reduced to its ultimate components - either black or white. Many 
practical situations, however, are intrinsically ambiguous. In such cases, forcing the 
application of general principles would mean squeezing the facts into neat legal 
categories. Unlike the pope, Baldus often shows more interest in those 'grey areas'. 
Hence the interest in the concept of possession. To explain this difference between 
Innocent IV and Baldus we will proceed gradually - from small differences to more 
significant ones. 
 
A first hint of this difference may be seen in Baldus' discussion of the crime 
committed in the exercise of the office. As we have just seen, so long as the defect of 
the person remains occult (i.e. no manifest), for Innocent IV this does not affect the 
right of the agent to represent the office. It follows that even if the agent were to use 
his office to commit a crime, he would still retain the right to exercise it - unless that 
crime becomes manifest or he is deposed with a legal decision. The Gloss of 
Accursius discussed the subject with regard to the church's steward (oeconomus) who 
alienated ecclesiastical land in violation of an imperial edict (Cod.1.2.14.3). Because 
of the particular wording of that edict, the Gloss concluded that the deposition of the 
steward was not ipso iure but required a judicial decision.79 Recalling that case, also 
Baldus agrees that a specific sentence of condemnation is needed.80 But the reason is 
wholly different from that of the Gloss. For Baldus the need of a legal sentence to 
depose the agent from office does not depend on the wording of a specific provision. 
Even if the law established the automatic dismissal from office for certain crimes, so 
long as the crime remained occult the office holder would be able to validly exercise 
it. 
                                                        
78 For a more in-depth analysis of the concept of jurisdictional toleration see Rossi, Representation and 
Ostensible Authority in Medieval Learned Law (note 72). 
79 Gloss ad Cod.1.2.14.3, § Oeconomus (Pandectarvm Ivris Civilis (note 16), vol. 4, col. 35). 
80 Baldus, ad Cod.1.2.14.3, § Sane (svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio Codicis (note 52), fols. 23vb-24ra, 
n. 2): 'Non obst(ante) quod sit priuandus officio: quia quamdiu non priuatur per sententiam retinet 
officium et exercitium officij: quod est notandum. Conclude ex hoc quod licet quis delinquerit in 
officio, tamen quamdiu superior non amoueat eum valent gesta per eum. ... Quinto querit glo(ssa) in § 
economus [supra, last note] nunquid iste economus sit priuatus vel priuandus dicit glo(ssa) quod est 
priuandus per sententiam propter verbum priuetur. Secus si dixisset priuatus sit'. 
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At this point in his discussion on the oeconomus, Baldus recalls another case, that of 
the notary who lets his clerk draft the instruments using his seal - a practice expressly 
forbidden in Justinian's Novel 44(=Coll.4.7). 81  While both the Novel and the 
Accursian Gloss condemned the notary but sought to rescue the instrument, Baldus' 
attention lingers on the notary himself. Much unlike the Gloss, he says, since the 
crime is not manifest the notary may continue to discharge his office until deposed 
with a legal decision.82 The conclusion is rather sensible: as the crime is not known, 
the automatic deposition would create chaos, for it would entail the ipso iure 
invalidity of any deed done between the commission of the crime and its eventual 
ascertainment (hence the problems of both Novel and Gloss on the subject). Baldus' 
reasoning, however, is not based on common sense but on Innocent IV's concept of 
toleration of the agent. Building on Innocent, however, Baldus adds something more. 
Even after committing a crime that calls for his removal from office, he says, the 
notary remains its legal representative because he is still in quasi possessio of the 
office.83 In this case, possession of the office (the quasi is due to the fact that the 
office is incorporeal)84 operates as a bridge between proper toleration and deposition. 
                                                        
81 While there was little doubt that the notary would forfeit his office, the Novel however allowed for 
the validity of the instrument because of public utility considerations. Coll.4.7.1(=Nov.44.1§4): 'Si 
vero praeter hoc fiat, et alter delegetur: tunc subiaceat poenae tabellio, qui auctoritatem habet a nobis 
dudum definitam: ipsis tamen documentis propter vtilitatem contrahentium non infirmandis.' Cf. H. 
Ankum, Les tabellions romains, ancetres directs des notaires modernes, in Atlas du notariat: le 
notariat dans le monde, Deventer 1989, pp. 5-48, at 37-39. The Gloss observed that letting such a 
document stand might well be acceptable in Constantinople, but surely not in Italy: a document drafted 
by someone else than the notary is surely void. However, continued the Gloss, the same public utility 
argument might well be used to argue for the validity of the instruments despite the dismissal from 
office of the notary who drafted them. Gloss ad Coll.4.7.1(=Nov.44.1§4), § documentis (Pandectarvm 
Ivris Civilis (note 16), vol. 5, col. 225): 'hic est argumentum, imo lex expressa quod tabellio non potest 
delegare discipulum suum ad componenda instrumenta. Sed si fecerit instrumentum, non vitiatur, sed 
tabellio poenam patitur. Sed certe hoc est in Constantinopolitana ciuitate tantum. Quid autem de aliis? 
... Item not(andum) hic aliud opimum ar(gumentum) quod vbicunque tabellio perdit officium suum ... 
quod non ideo debent vitiari sua instrumenta. Et facit ff. de offic(io) praet(orum) l. Barbarius 
(Dig.1.14.3). Et hoc est verum: arg(umentum) contra(rium) tamen est C. de sen(tentia) pas(sis) l. fina. 
(Cod.9.51.13).' 
82 Baldus, ad Cod.1.2.14.3, § Sane (svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio Codicis (note 52), fol. 24ra, n. 2): 
'Adde tamen quod vbi non requiritur sententia dispositiua: si tamen factum reuocatur in dubium 
requiritur sententia declaratoria ... facit quod not(atum) in aut(hentica) de tabel(lionibus) § penul. 
(coll.4.7.1=Nov.44.1§4), vbi dicit gl(ossa) quod si tabellio per sententiam legis est priuatus officio 
tabellionatus, hoc tamen non est declaratum per sententiam hominis, sed est occultum. Et iste tabellio 
exercet officium quia est quasi in possessione officii quod valent instrumenta sua quod alibi in iure 
ciuili non habens.' Cf. supra, note 81. 
83 Baldus, ad Cod.1.2.14.3, § Sane (svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio Codicis (note 52), fol. 24ra, n. 2).  
84 Quasi possessio was often used in relation to incorporeal things since, strictly speaking, they could 
not be possessed. Iurisdictio was among them. As Bartolus has it, ‘iurisdictio est quoddam ius 
incorporale. In iure enim consistentia incorporalia sunt: ut ff. de rer(um) diui(sione) l. i § i (Dig.1.8.1.1) 
ergo vendicari non potest, cum ea vendicantur, quae possidentur' (Bartolus, Tractatus de iurisdictione, 
in Bartoli a Saxoferrato Consilia, Quaestiones, & Tractatus ... Basileae, ex officina Episcopiana, 1588, 
p. 393, n. 6). The concept of quasi possessio was often discussed with regard to usucapion of 
servitudes. Writing on servitudes (incorporeal rights par excellence), the same Bartolus says: 'in istis 
iuribus incorporalib(us) non cadit aliqua possessio, sed quasi possessio, quae dicitur patientia 
aduersarii: ut l. pen(ultima) ff. de serui(tutibus) (Dig.8.1.19)' (Id., ad Cod.3.34.1, § Si quas, In Primam 
Partem Codicis Bartoli a Saxoferrato Commentaria ..., Basileae, ex officina Episcopiana, 1588, p. 365, 
n. 5). By the same token, even the exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of a forged document of the 
prince confers quasi possessio of jurisdiction, which allows its recipient to pronounce a valid sentence - 
see again Bartolus, ad Cod.1.22.2 (ibid., p. 110, n. 6). The first Civilian known to have used the 
concept of quasi possessio for jurisdiction is Pillius de Medicina. According to Pillius, the possessor 
could use an actio negatoria utilis - shaped after that for the usufruct - to retain his jurisdiction. 
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And here, in this grey area, Baldus' position begins to diverge from that of Innocent 
IV.  
Another (and slightly more visible) hint comes from the case of the prelate secretly 
removed from office - the occultus exhautoratus. Innocent did not write about this 
case, and (perhaps for this reason) Baldus mentions it only briefly. In so doing, 
Baldus is in effect applying Innocent's reasoning on the occult excommunicate. Just 
as Innocent applied the toleration principle for the occult excommunicate,85 so Baldus 
argues that the person secretly removed from office can still represent it. As with the 
case of the notary, the solution is a sensible one. If all the deeds made by the agent 
after his secret deposition were to be void, this would create a series of retroactive 
invalidities (or rather, postponed declarations of nullity) for any transaction directly or 
indirectly relying on such deeds. Again, chaos. However, while Innocent came to this 
solution exclusively on the basis of the perduring agency relationship, Baldus shifts 
the focus towards possession: the superior authority secretly deprived the person of 
his entitlement to represent the office, but left him in possession of it. This means, 
argues Baldus, that some some 'vestige' (reliquie) of the initial confirmation still 
remain.86 We are already beyond Innocent here. The symmetry between internal and 
external validity of agency is still present, but it is much more tenuous: the internal 
validity is now hanging by a thin thread - so thin that is about to break. Baldus is 
arguing for the external validity of agency (the right to exercise the office validly) on 
the basis of a 'vestige' of its former internal validity: possession no longer backed by 
formal entitlement.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Celeberrimi Ivre cons(ulti) ac Glosatoris vetustissimi D. Pilei Modicensis Qvaestiones avreae [Romae, 
1560], q. 102, pp. 178-179. In canon law, the principle that one may have quasi possessio of iurisdictio 
came with the decretal Conquestus of Gregory IX (X.2.2.16, cf. A. Potthast (ed.), Regesta pontificum 
Romanorum, Berlin 1874, vol. 1, p. 818, n. 9583). 
85 Innocent IV, ad X.5.27.10, § Irritanda (Commentaria Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fol. 522rb): 'Alii 
dicunt, et vt videtur melius, quod siue bonus, siue malus etiam haereticus, vel excommunicatus, dum 
toleratur ab ecclesia per electionem, et confirmationem, etiam si fiat a peccatoribus, etiam ab haereticis 
vel excommunicatis, dummodo tolerantur, bene contrahit in huiusmodi matrimonio spirituali, quousque 
separetur palea a granis.' 
85 Innocent IV, ad X.5.39.34, § Circa temporalia (ibid., fol. 552ra, n. 3): 'Item dum tolerantur in aliqua 
dignitate, et sint occulti, non nominatim excommunicati: satis videtur quod possint excommunicare, 
beneficia conferre, literas impetrare, quia haec, ipsa dignitas facere videtur, et non persona 
excommunicata 8. q.4. <c.> nonne (C.8, q.4, c.1)'. Cf. P. Fedele, Il funzionario di fatto nel diritto 
canonico, in Studi in onore di Francesco Scaduto, Firenze 1936, vol. 1, pp. 321-388, at 341-345. See 
also Innocent IV, ad X.5.7.16, § Absolutos and § Manifeste (ibid., fol. 507vb): 'Absolutos se noverint a 
debito fidelitatis et totius obsequii, quicunque lapsis manifeste in haeresim aliquo pacto, quacunque 
firmitate vallato, tenebatur adstricti. ... Secus si occulte, arg(umentum) s(upra) simo(nia) c. vlt(imo) 
(X.5.3.46) 11 q.3 c.3 et c. Iulianus (C.11, q.3, c.3 and c.94) ibi loquitur de apostata tolerato.' 
86 Baldus, ad Cod.3.34.2, § Si aquam (svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio Codicis (note 52), fol. 219ra, n. 
83-84): 'Nunc de octauo puncto, scilicet de obedientia et iurisdictione: an sit obediendum minus iusto 
prelato qui est in pacifica possessione officii sui: et an possit exercere iurisdictionem suam in rebelles 
et videtur quod sic: vt in d(icta) l. barbarius (Dig.1.14.3). Sed in illa l(ege) concurrebant tria, scilicet 
superioris summa auctoritas, error communis qui idem operatur quod veritas i(nfra) de test(amentis) l. i 
(Cod.6.23.1) et publica vtilitas. ... Idem si concurrerent alia duos, s(cilicet) error communis et publica 
vtilitas, licet cesset superioris auctoritas: ut p(atet) in occulto exautorato, vt no(tatur) in aut(hentica) de 
tabel(lionibus) § pe(nultimo) (coll.4.7.1=Nov.44.1§4). Sed potest dici quod in exautorato adhuc 
remanent reliquie quedam: vt not(atur) de aucto(ritate) tut(orum) l. si pluribus (Dig.26.8.4). Secus ergo 
in eo qui nunquam fuit autoritate superioris fretus seu prelatus, sed forte per falsas literas obtinuit 
reputari prelatus, ar(gumentum) ff. de iudi(ciis) <l.> non idcirco § cum postea (Dig.5.1.44.1), et quod 
not(at) Inno(centius) in c. in literis, de resti(tutione spoliatorum) [Innocent IV, ad X.2.13.5, infra, note 
94].'  
 25 
It is important to highlight that, for Baldus, the possession of an office after manifest 
deposition (i.e., typically, done with a judicial condemnation) has no legal relevance, 
it only amounts to 'undue' (abusiva) possession. Indeed, he says elsewhere, 
'deposition changes the cause of possession from something into nothing'. 87  By 
contrast, in the present situation the occult character of the deposition seems to leave 
the cause of possession, at least in part (there is still a 'vestige' of that 'something'). 
The result is plainly ambiguous: neither full deposition nor (and unlike Innocent) full 
agency. To explore this ambiguity we have now to look at Baldus' commentary on the 
Liber Extra. 
 
There, a first and very significant canon law issue discussed by Baldus is that of the 
agent secretly suspended from office. During the first half of the thirteenth century, 
canon lawyers discussed much on whether the prelate suspended from office could 
still administer it. Some slightly earlier jurists, such as Laurentius Hispanus and 
Johannes Teutonicus, were in favour of that solution. Other and slightly later ones, 
such as Bernardus Parmensis, were firmly opposed to it.88 Innocent IV agreed with 
Parmensis. 89 In saying as much, however, Innocent carved out an exception for the 
case the suspension from office is not known, and the prelate is commonly believed 
not to be suspended. In that case, explained the pope, the deeds are valid. However, 
he hastened to add, this is not because of the common opinion as to the condition of 
the person (qua individual). Rather, it is because the occult condition of the individual 
allows to consider the agency link between agent and office as not yet severed.90 The 
                                                        
87 Baldus, ad X.1.6.44, § nichil (Baldvs svper Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 69vb, n. 10): 'Adde quod 
nullus habens canonicum ingressum ad titulum et possessionem est intrusus nisi sit depositus vt 
hereticus vel per sententiam superioris quia depositio mutat causam possessionis de aliqua in nulla, 
siue de canonica in abusiuam, etiam si de facto possessio continuetur'. Mere possession of office 
without any right to it qualifies the possessor as intruder: 'Item potest dari hec regula quod intrusus 
dicitur omnis qui interrogatus cur possideat non potest aliter respondere nisi quia possideo' (ibid., n. 7). 
88 Bernardus Parmensis, ad X.1.4.8, § A suspensis (Decretalium domini pape Gregorij noni compilatio 
..., Basileae [Johann Froben & Amerbach], 1500): 'suspensus enim non potest eligere nec eligi ... Sed 
nonne iudicare et praebendas dare est iurisdictionis? vti quia i(nfra) de elec(tione) <c.> nosti (X.1.6.9), 
et excommunicare, i(nfra) de elec(tione) <c.> transmissam (X.1.6.15), nunquid suspensus potest 
huyiusmodi iurisdictionem exercere? Dicunt quidam quod episcopus suspensus potest excommunicare, 
et praebendas dare: et respondent illi decre(tali) quia diuiersitatem (X.3.8.5) quod ille episcopus erat ab 
officio suspensus et iurisdictione. Sed dicunt quod canonicus suspensus eligere non potest: quia cum sit 
suspensus nihil officii retinet. Secus est in praelato ... Alii dicunt et melius quod episcopus suspensus 
non potest excommunicare, nec interdicere, nec dare prebendas, i(nfra) de exces(sibus) prela(torum) c. 
vlti(mum) (X.5.31.18). ... Joh(annis) et Lauren(tius) hoc concedunt, quod suspensus ab officio tamen 
potest excommunicare et praebendas dare: et intelligunt illam decre(talem) quia diuersitatem (X.3.8.5) 
cum erat suspensus ab officio et iurisdictione. Ergo autem non credo quod suspesus ab homine possit 
dare praebendas: vt hic dicitur, licet Lau(rentius) et Joh(annis) concedant quod possit excommunicare 
et praebendas dare.' 
89 Provided of course that the suspension did not just refer to the enjoyment of the prebend associated 
with the office (a rather common form of punishment), but to the office itself. Innocent IV, ad X.1.4.8, 
§ Suspensus (Commentaria Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fol. 34rb, n. 4): 'Quidam tamen dicunt, sed non 
placet, quod [suspensus] excommunicare possit, et praebendas dare, et alia facere quae sunt ex 
iurisdictione, non de ordine, arg(umentum) infra, de elect(tione) <c.> ex transmissa (sic) (X.1.6.15). Et 
haec inteligimus vera, nisi suspensus est ab officio et beneficio, vel officium tantum cum ratione officij 
competat beneficium, 81. dist. <c.> si quis sacerdotum, et c. eos (D.81, c.17-18)'.  
90 Innocent IV, ad X.1.4.8, § Suspensus (Commentaria Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fol. 34rb, n. 4): '... 
Item dicunt quidam quod licet non valeat in spiritualibus, quod facit excommunicatus vel suspensus, 
valet tamen in temporalibus quamdiu toleratur ex ignorantia, quia forte sunt suspensi a iure, non per 
sententiam, et ideo omnia eius facta tenent arg(umentum) 8. q. 3. nonne (rectius, C.8, q.4, c.1). Sed hoc 
verum non credimus in his quae ratione publici officii faciunt, argu(mentum) ff. de offi(cio) 
praeto(rum) l. Barbarius (Dig.1.14.3).' 
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office may still act validly through the person of its agent, therefore, because that 
person (despite being secretly suspended) is still able to represent it. 
It is against this background that we should approach Baldus' position on the matter. 
Baldus devotes only few lines to it - few but crucial. First, he succinctly reports the 
different positions.91 Then, he concludes saying something of extreme importance:92  
 
That who is occultly suspended may do anything as to the others, but not as to himself. In 
other words, he can grant to anyone but he cannot grant to himself 
 
The secretly suspended from office may exercise his office validly - but only towards 
third parties, not himself. In stating as much, Baldus is openly severing Innocent's 
symmetry and begins to distinguish between internal and external validity in the 
agent-principal relationship.  
Baldus' solution depends on the combination of two elements: first (as in Innocent), 
the separation between person and agent; second (and much unlike the pope), the 
legal relevance of the possession of the office by the secretly suspended. To 
understand the difference with Innocent, we have now to focus on this second element 
- possession. 
 
3.3. Agency triangle  
When distinguishing between obligations of the person qua individual and qua agent, 
as we have seen in the first part of this study, Baldus relies on practical examples 
involving some third party. As the examples always focus on obligations, the 
presence of third parties might appear a truism. Nonetheless, this truism is important. 
Applied to the principal-agent context, the obligation against a third party forms a 
triangle: agent, office and third party. Just as the dychotomy between internal and 
external validity of the acts, also the 'agency triangle' is a well known concept in 
today's agency theory. But not in Baldus' times.  
This triangular situation is to be found in several cases described by Baldus, typically 
dealing with the succession of the incumbent in office. Some of them are centred on 
the obligation undertaken by the previous incumbent, others on the incumbent's 
appointment to a specific role (e.g. testamentary executor). In both instances the 
problem is ultimately the same: distinguishing between agent and person. The third 
party (whether a proper counterparty, as in the first group of cases, or an appointor, as 
in the second group) always occupies one 'angle' of this triangular relationship. To 
solve those cases, Baldus (just as Innocent did) moves from the 'angle' occupied by 
the third party. The point is important, for the way the triangle is drawn has important 
consequences for the outcome of the case. In some instances Baldus links this 'angle' 
directly to the 'angle' of the office, in others to that of the individual person who 
represents it. In this second case (i.e. where the third party deals with the agent first of 
all as an individual person), in effect, there is no triangle at all. The further 
qualification of this person as legal representative of the office is irrelevant. The 
                                                        
91 Baldus, ad X.1.4.8, § Suspensus (Baldvs svper Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 47va, n. 17): 'In gl(osa) 
suspensus enim queritur vtrum suspensus possit iudicare prebendas dare vel iurisdictionem aliquam 
exercere, quidam dicunt quod sic licet non possit eligere nec eligi; gl(osa) finaliter tenet contrarium et 
intelligit hoc verum in suspensis ab homine nisi sit minor suspensio i(n) partecipatione excommunicati. 
Alij dicunt quod ea que competunt ratione officii non potest facere qui suspensus est ab officio sed ea 
que competunt ratione beneficii potest facere sicut potest locare predia beneficii sui.' 
92  Baldus, ad X.1.4.8, § Suspensus (Baldvs svper Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 47va, n. 17): 'Item 
no(tatur) quod occulte suspensus omnia potest quo ad alium licet non quo ad se, i(d est) omnibus potest 
conferre sed non potest sibi conferri'. 
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relationship is only between third party and individual person: not a triangle, but a 
segment. When the third party deals with that individual qua agent, by contrast, the 
legal relationship is between third party and office. Since the office can only will and 
act through a physical person, that relationship has to be extended to the agent as well. 
Hence the need of a triangular relationship. But the triangle (and so, the third 'angle' - 
the person of the agent) comes into play only because of the immediate relationship 
between third party and office (Baldus' causa remota of the deeds of the agent).93 
When the primary relationship is between office and third party, therefore, the person 
of the agent is of secondary importance. In a manner of speech, the agent is fungible. 
And this fungibility is what allows the succession of the new agent in the same 
relationship with the third party (be it a contract or an appointment) as his 
predecessor. In all such cases, Baldus draws the triangular relationship always moving 
from the third party towards the office. Only then does he link the office to the agent. 
The movement from the third party to the physical person representing the office is 
therefore always a proper triangle, for between the third and the person of the agent 
there is always the office. 
 
The difference between Baldus and Innocent on the external validity of the deeds (in 
our triangle, the relationship between office and third party), may be appreciated 
looking at the issue of the payment of debts. Can the payment to the false agent 
release the debtor? When dealing with this issue, Innocent remarked that common 
mistake is not sufficient to make the payment valid: the debtor paying to the agent 
apparent is not released from his debt to the office. This for Innocent was a question 
of pure logic applied to legal relationships: the debt is owed to the office, the agent 
apparent does not have the power to represent the office, so the debtor would be 
paying to a third party.94  
To acquire the power to represent the office it is necessary to receive confirmation in 
office by the superior authority. That much, for Innocent, was non-negotiable. In 
principle, Baldus agrees with the pope. Without the confirmation by the superior 
authority, the simple possession of an office cannot become legal representation. We 
have seen that, when referring to the 'mystical body' of the church to describe the 
relationship between prelate as agent (the 'soul') and church as office (the 'body'), 
Baldus argued that the prelate who cannot be the 'soul' of the church may not act in its 
name.95 In that example the prelate was in possession of the 'body' of the church 
without having valid appointment. The lack of valid appointment does not allow the 
                                                        
93 Supra, text and note 35. 
94 Innocent IV, ad X.1.6.44, § Administrent (Commentaria Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fol. 75ra-b, n. 
4): 'Nam ubi aliquis est intrusus, in aliqua ecclesia sine authoritate superioris qualis est omnis non 
confirmatus, puta quia sua authoritate occupavit, vel aliorum potentum, quicquid facit non tenet, sive 
alienando, sive praebendas conferendo, sive agendo, sive iudicando, nec liberantur ei solventes 16. q.7 
<c.> si quis de(inceps) (C.16, q.7, c.12) sicut etiam non tenerent, si a quocunque extraneo fierent, non 
enim debet esse melioris conditionis, quia vitiosus est.’ See also, and more specifically, Innocent's 
commentary on X.2.13.5, § In literis (ibid., fols. 226vb-227ra, n. 3): 'Sed quaero quid facient subditi 
debitores huiusmodi violenti possessoris? Respon(deo) non respondebunt de iuribus pertinentibus ad 
dignitatem, quam violenter possidet, nec potest conqueri hic violentus praelatus de eis, qui spoliauerunt 
eum non reddendo sibi debitam obedientiam ... quia ipsi non spoliant, cum non fuerit in possessione 
recipiendi huiusmodi ab eis, licet fuerit in violenta possessione dignitatis cui haec debentur ... imo nec 
subditi per violentiam debent malaefidei possessorem expellere de possessione ... sed denegare possunt 
sine violentia, tamen in ea in quorum mala possessione erat possessor, quod sic probatur, quia si sponte 
soluat, praestat malaefidei possessori causam peccandi. Item non liberatur subditus debitor per talem 
solutione, quin dignitati teneatur, cum non ei, sed dignitati sit obligatus.' 
95 Supra, note 51. 
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prelate to act in the name of the church. In such a case, says Baldus, the prelate is like 
a 'honorary guardian without administration'.96 Only confirmation in office allows de 
iure representation.   
So far, Baldus seems to be following in Innocent's footsteps: 'I am not surprised that 
sometimes those who pay are deceived - he even says - for the legislator is no friend 
of mistake'.97 The problem was to what extent should the uncompromising position of 
Innocent be followed. Unlike the pope, Baldus is not always ready to dismiss so 
easily the possession of the office: ignoring the simple fact that the prelate is widely 
seen as being in possession of the office can be problematic - if not in theory, surely 
in practice. Possessing something is prima facie evidence of being entitled to it. 
Unchallenged possession of an office does not lead to proper representation, but it can 
create a semblance of agency.98 Possession shows the underlying relationship between 
person and office without proving its entitlement - even less establishing it. Hence the 
practical problems. Let us suppose, says Baldus, that the intruder in an ecclesiastical 
office comes to the debtor and says: 'I am in possession and I am publicly called and 
treated as prelate by all others, hence you should do the same'. As a matter of 
principle, the debtor should ask the intruder to prove his right before paying to him 
what he owes to the office.99 At the same time, however, unchallenged possession of 
the office would typically point to the underlying right to exercise it. In such 
circumstances, Baldus opines, a judge might consider the improper payment to release 
the debtor. To strengthen his conclusion, Baldus points to the affinity between this 
case and that of the ward's business transacted by the false guardian. Under certain 
circumstances the transaction is valid, for the praetor can ratify the deed.100 It is 
important to remark that, in this example, the praetor did not simply consider the 
payment valid, but ratified it for equitable considerations. The 'mechanism' is the 
same in the case of improper payment: the validity of the payment to the false agent 
in possession of the office is not a legal effect of the mistake of the debtor, but it 
depends on the authority of the judge. The relationship between third party and office 
is valid, but this has no consequences as to the relationship between office and its 
possessor. This way, Baldus avoids the harshness of Innocent's conclusion without 
bestowing internal validity to abusive agency.  
It may be recalled that, writing on the validity of the deeds done by the secretly 
deposed, Baldus considered his enduring possession of the office as a 'vestige' of the 
previous confirmation in it.101 Leaving the old agent in unchallenged possession of the 
office, for Baldus the secret deposition does not amount to full deposition. The 
secretly deposed, therefore, may continue to validly discharge the office. Occult 
                                                        
96 Supra, note 50. 
97 Baldus, ad X.2.13.5, § In literis (Baldvs svper Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 149va, n. 8): 'nec mirum 
quod aliquando decipiantur soluentes, quia legislator non est amicus errorem'. 
98 Cf. Baldus, ad X.2.13.5, § Item cum quis (Baldvs svper Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 149vb, n. 3): '... 
habitus monachum non facit, licet ostendit eum monachum si sit ei impositus per habentem potestatem 
vel authoritatem.' 
99 Ibid.: ' ... Sed ecce aliquis tanquam prelatus agit contra debitorem ecclesie, debet debitor ostendere 
de prelatura, i(d est) de mandato: "alias non possum tibi soluere" ... dicit prelatus: "ego sum in 
possessione et publice vocor et tractur tamquam prelatus per alios vniuersos: ergo et per te debeo 
tractari." ' 
100 Ibid.: '... dic quod sufficit prelato quod sit in vniuersali possessione: licet iste debitor nunquam 
agnouerit debitum nec fuerit confessus illum esse prelatum dummodo pro prelato publice reputetur: vt 
i(nfra) e(o titulo) c. in literis (X.2.13.5). Ego dico quod iudex cauere debet se ratum habiturum quod 
cum eo gestum erit vel non tenetur debitor soluere ... vt l. i § idem pomponius ff. quod cum fal(so) 
tut(ore) au<c>t(ore) (Dig.27.6.1.5) et ratione dubii videtur decretum.' 
101 Supra, note 86. 
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suspension from office is not as grave a penalty as deposition: hence the dispute 
among canon lawyers on the right of the prelate secretly suspended from office to 
continue administering it.102 While Innocent solved that dispute applying the concept 
of jurisdictional toleration (focusing on the enduring right of the occult suspended to 
represent his office), Baldus highlighted the role of possession of that office. Since the 
occult suspended from office retained lawful possession of it, he could still discharge 
the office. The solution of Baldus was ultimately the same as Innocent. But its 
rationale was different: not proper agency (right to discharge the office), but lawful 
possession of the office.  
The possession of the secretly suspended from office is clearly stronger than that of 
the simple intruder posing as agent. Unlike the payment to the agent apparent, for the 
secretly suspended there is no need of a judge sympathetic towards the debtor's 
mistake to hold the payment valid. At the same time, the difference with Innocent - 
stressing the lawful possession fo the office, not the enduring right to it - had 
important consequences. The validity of the payment to the occult suspended pertains 
only to the external side of agency: in our triangle, to the relationship between third 
party and office. As the superior authority withdrew its approval of the office holder, 
for Baldus the internal side of agency is compromised. This different approach 
allowed Baldus to conclude his reasoning in a very un-Innocentian manner: 'that who 
is occultly suspended may do anything as to the others, but not as to himself'.103 If the 
suspended from office were to act for the office to make a transaction with himself, 
third party and individual who acts as agent would coincide. In such a case, the 
external side of agency would be just a replica of the internal side. Hence Baldus 
rejects the validity of the deeds done by the agent occultly suspended from office 
towards himself as private individual. In so doing, Baldus separates internal from 
external validity of agency to deny the first while allowing the latter. This has nothing 
to do with conflict of interest: the suspension of the agent is occult and so hidden to 
anyone - but for the agent. 
If we look at the case of the secretly suspended from office keeping in mind the 
agency triangle, we might notice that Baldus draws it starting with the ‘angle’ of the 
third party, and analysing the relationship between third party and office first. Only 
then does he move to that between office and agent. The first relationship, designating 
the external side of agency, is valid. The other, pointing to the internal side of agency, 
is on the contrary deemed invalid. As always, the direction is important: had Baldus 
moved from the person of the agent, he would have reached the office first, and only 
then, finally, the third party. In such a case, it would have not been possible to justify 
the external validity of agency (the link office-third party) moving from the invalidity 
of its internal relationship (the link agent-office). Focusing on the right of the agent to 
represent the office, Innocent always moved from the internal side. So he required 
perfect symmetry between internal and external sides of agency. Baldus on the 
contrary moved from possession of the office: a concept insufficient for the internal 
validity of agency, but strong enough to justify the relationship between third party 
and office, in the person of its possessor.  
At the same time, however, this kind of possession is different from that of the 
impostor. Alone, simple possession of the office cannot ascribe external validity to 
non-existing agency. Rather, the validity derives from the specific quality of this 
                                                        
102 Supra, notes 88-89. 
103 Supra, note 92. 
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possession: not just de facto holding of the office (as an impostor would do), but 
lawful possession deriving from the 'vestige' of the previous full entitlement to it.  
Just as in the case of the occult deposed, but more openly, in that of the occult 
suspended Baldus reaches the external validity of agency by blurring the difference 
between entitlement and possession. As said, Innocent did not write on the validity of 
the deeds of the prelate secretly deposed, but only of the secretly suspended from 
office (hence, perhaps, the reason why Baldus dealt more with this second case). The 
pope used this case to explain the difference between individual office and collegiate 
body. When a member of a collegiate office, such as a chapter, is suspended from 
office, he cannot exercise his prerogatives. The same however is not true for an 
individual office. The difference depends on the fact that no individual member of the 
chapter is himself the legal representative of the office, whereas the agent of the 
individual office is.104 For Innocent, therefore, occult suspension does not undermine 
the internal validity of agency. As individual, the person is clearly indignus (both 
unworthy and legally unfit) of his office. But the fact that this indignitas is occult 
allows the person to be tolerated in office: shifting the accent on the persion qua 
agent, in other words, the pope allowed the indignus to retain the right to administer 
the office.  
The Innocentian concept of toleration, we have seen, is rooted in the entitlement of a 
right – the right to represent the office validly. The unworthy tolerated in office, for 
the pope, retains full right to discharge the office; the moment he were to lose this 
right (i.e. the moment the internal side of agency were to be severed), the old 
incumbent would ipso facto become an intruder.105 As there may not be different 
‘degrees’ of toleration, the idea of a ‘vestige’ of previous confirmation in office is 
entirely alien to Innocent. Despite its name, the concept of toleration is rather 
inflexible. Opposing external validity to internal invalidity, Baldus trades toleration in 
office with lawful possession of it. This allows greater flexibility, for it severs the 
symmetry between the two sides of agency. But it also introduces an ambiguity not 
present in Innocent’s elaboration: possession of the office is neither unlawful exercise 
of office, nor full entitlement to represent it.  
 
Another interesting case where Baldus uses the concept of possession to make up for 
the invalidity of the internal side of agency is on invalid elections. To exercise an 
ecclesiastical office validly, as we have seen, Innocent required both election and 
confirmation in office. While confirmation can normally cure the defect in the 
election, it does not have the power to make up for the ipso iure void election. For 
Innocent, such is the case when the election was done in violation of natural (i.e., 
ultimately divine) law.106 Innocent, it should be said, was not particularly clear on the 
                                                        
104 Innocent IV, ad X.1.4.8, § Suspensus (Commentaria Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fol. 34ra-b, n. 4); 
cf. supra, note 90. 
105 Innocent IV, ad X.5.1.24, § Et famam (ibid., fols. 495vb-496ra, n. 10): ‘… nisi esset in eum lata 
sententia depositionis, vel spoliatus esset insignibus dignitatis, tunc enim sententia a tali praelato lata, 
non tenet ff. de his qui no(tantur) infam(ia) l. secunda § igitur [rectius, § ignominiae, Dig.3.2.2.2], ff. 
de iudi(ciis) <l.> cum praetor (Dig.5.1.12pr) nec potest dici, quod toleretur, sed intrusus dicitur. 
Credimus tamen, quod ex quo sententia de aliquo crimine lata est contra aliquem sive criminaliter, sive 
civiliter agitur, quod episcopus vel praelatus suus potest eum spoliare beneficiis, quod sub eo habet, 2. 
q.1. <c.> multi (C.2, q.1, c.18) tamen debet eum vocare, et contra eum sententiam ferre, si invenietur, 
et si non inveniatur, eodem modo damnabit eum, quia notorum est crimen per sententiam'.  
106 Innocent IV, ad X.1.6.28, § Propter bonum pacis (ibid., fol. 59rb-va, n. 8-9): 'vix est electio, nisi 
omnia iura solennia obseruentur, et tamen ideo non est nulla, nec cassatur electio. In alio autem casu, 
scilicet, quando ea interueniunt, quare est nulla electio de iure positiuo, sed alia de iure naturali, tunc 
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point.107 Instead of seeking to clarify what the pope left unsaid, however, Baldus 
focuses on the consequences of the invalid confirmation. If the underlying defect is 
manifest, the ensuing invalidity of the confirmation is clear. By contrast, where that 
defect is hidden, the solution is considerably more problematic. Both the superior 
authority confirming the unworthy in office and the third party dealing with him (as 
agent of the office) might well not be aware of the defect. When the ignorance of the 
third party is coupled with a similar ignorance of the superior authority, the problem 
becomes particularly difficult to solve. As we have seen, in principle the debtor 
should always ask the agent to prove his right to represent the office before paying to 
him what is due to the office.108 In case of ipso iure invalidity of the election for an 
occult defect, however, the agent could well prove both election and, especially, 
confirmation. But if the confirmation may not cure the underlying invalidity of the 
election, distinguishing appearance from reality becomes almost impossible. This is 
why Baldus takes particular care in the way he describes such a case: the confirmation 
is valid, he says, 'so long as [the prelate] is in possession of the authority of the 
superior'.109  
                                                                                                                                                              
distingue: quia si dolus vel delictum electi, vel eligentium fecit, quod electio sit nulla etiam de iure 
naturali, vt quia intrusus est vel simoniace electus, tunc semper habet locum regula praedicta, scilicet, 
quod deponatur ordinans et ordinatus, nec tenent ordinationes eorum, quod ad executiones, 62. distinct. 
c. i. (D.62, c.1) ... si autem dolus vel delictum non fuit tale, quod electionem faceret nulla, sed 
annullandam, vt contemptus alicuius qui electioni interesse debet, tunc non debet renunciare 
beneficium si quaesitum, nec peccat tenendo contra voluntatem contempti, nisi prohibeatur a iudice ... 
si autem deliquit tacendo irregularitatem suam, tunc omnibus modis debet offerre renunciationem 
suam, et peccat tacendo beneficium, sed tamen dispensabit superior in aliquibus irregularibus.' The 
distinction seems based on voidness vs. voidability: when the violation is of a human rule (i.e. positive 
law) but not of a natural law rule, then it is necessary to pronounce it void. The pronouncement is 
constitutive - it avoids the election. The difference is of great importance: until pronounced void, the 
voidable election also confers executio. This is the case, for instance, of the elected who did not 
disclose his personal incapacity. In such cases, concludes the pope, 'ordinationes eius executionem 
habet, quia non erat nulla electio de iure naturali, sed deponendus erat' (ibid., fol. 59va, n. 8). 
107 Regrettably, Innocent did not explain this difference in detail. More precisely, he did not say which 
rules in the election process were of natural law and which of positive law. The main example he gave 
of an election made in breach of natural law was remarkably ambiguous, for he referred to simony. 
Simoniacal elections are void also for natural law, said Innocent, so the elected ought not to be 
confirmed, but rather deposed together with the electors. Ibid. Commenting on the same chapter (but 
before distinguishing between violations of natural law and of positive law) Innocent considered ipso 
iure void also the election of the bishop made by the emperor or a king (ibid., ad X.1.6.28, § 
infirmanda, fol. 58va-b, n. 3-4). Such an election may be quashed even after the confirmation, despite 
that both confirmation and consecration be formally valid ('licet confirmatio et consecratio rite factae 
sint', ibid., fol. 58vb, n. 4). The ambiguity lies in that, arguing that simoniacal elections remain ipso 
iure void would clash with all the cases where the same Innocent used the occult simoniac confirmed 
in office as an example of toleration: see esp. ibid., Id., ad X.3.2.7, § Operis (ibid., fol. 350ra, n. 2). 
While the point remains unclear (Baldus for instance thought that Innocent had simply changed his 
mind: Baldus, additio ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 
59rb, n. 9), it would seem that, in giving the example of simoniacal ordinations as a case of violation of 
natural law, the pope was focusing on sacramental issues, not jurisdictional ones. Indeed, the only 
reference provided by Innocent on the consequences of simoniacal elections in that passage was a text 
of the Decretum (D.62, c.1), which held void the simoniacal election of a bishop, and similarly avoided 
the ordinations made by such pseudoepiscopi. Dealing only with sacramental issues, the text however 
left untouched the validity of the administrative (and so, jurisdictional) deeds of the same 'pseudo-
bishops'.   
108 Supra, note 99. 
109 Baldus, ad Cod.3.34.2, § Si aquam (svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio Codicis (note 52), fol. 218va, n. 
73): 'Premitte quanquam ille qui est in possessione est funditus falsus praelatus: et talis possessio non 
patrocinatur ... quanquam non est funditus falsus, quia habet confirmationem superioris, tunc autem 
confirmatio est nulla ipso iure: aut valet licet confirmatus si indignus: prio<re> casu aut est vitium 
 32 
To understand this point, we should think again of the case of occult deposition from 
office in Baldus. Leaving the agent in possession of the office, the occult deposition 
did not fully sever the link with the superior authority that previously confirmed him 
in office. The link was almost severed, but not fully. There was only a ‘vestige’ of it. 
And the enduring possession of the office was the tangible evidence of that ‘vestige’.  
In the case of confirmation of an ipso iure void election, on the contrary, the link 
between agent and superior authority is void from the outset. So the concept of 
possession is not referred to the office, but directly to the authority of the superior. If 
If occult deposition was already a rather ambiguous concept (lying mid-way between 
proper agency and 'standard' deposition), this new one is even more so. It is not 
surprising that the idea of possessing the confirmation (instead of being confirmed) is 
nowhere to be found in Innocent. At the same time, however, the pope did not fully 
explain the consequences of an ipso iure void election either. This left a gap that 
could not be filled (at least, not in a satisfactory manner) relying only on the full 
symmetry between internal and external validity of agency. Internal validity required 
valid confirmation, but the latent defect leading to the ipso iure invalidity of the 
appointment was an insurmountable obstable to that. To be valid, confirmation in 
office required full knowledge of the defect 110  (which here on the contrary was 
unknown even to the superior authority), and in any case it could not cure those 
defects leading to the ipso iure invalidity of the appointment. Ambiguous as it may 
be, the idea that the elected who may not be confirmed in his office receives 
possession of the authority of the superior was a brilliant solution. Here as well, 
possession solved the impasse because of its greater flexibility than the concept of 
entitlement. Moving the focus away from the relationship person-office and towards 
that elected-superior authority, it circumvents the limits of the Innocentian concept of 
toleration while at the same time relying on it, for it shifts the perspective from the 
indignitas of the agent to the superior dignitas of the higher authority. The question 
now is no longer of entitlement to the office, but of higher jurisdiction: 'As the 
superior considers him as [confirmed], so anyone else must consider him such'.111 
Stating as much, Baldus refers to the same text invoked in his discussion on the 
payment to the agent apparent: the ratification of the false guardian’s deeds by the 
praetor (Dig.27.6.1.5).112 This is important. The agent apparent, as we have seen, 
insisted on his right because 'all others' held him as true representative of the office.113 
Those 'others', however, were all third parties. Hence the need to invoke the 
iurisdictio of the magistrate: the debtor was not released from his debt to the office 
                                                                                                                                                              
patens et repellitur, aut latens et non repellitur, ar(gumentum) ff. de mi(noribus) l. verum § ex facto 
(Dig.4.4.11.2) et l. minor xxv an. ex aspectu (Dig.4.4.32) ... Secundo casu non repellitur quamdiu est in 
possessione autoritate superioris, ar(gumentum) de off(icio) presi(dis) (sic) <l.> barbarius (Dig.1.14.3), 
de rescri(ptis) <c.> sciscitatus (X.1.3.13) per Innoc(entium)' (emphasis added). Cf. Innocent IV, infra, 
note 146. 
110 Cf. Innocent IV, ad X.1.6.32, § Confirmauit (Commentaria Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fol. 63ra-b, 
n. 1-2): 'confirmatio electionis tenet etiam si electio fit nulla, dummodo fiat ex certa scientia 
confirmationis, et durante voluntate eligentium ... Item confirmatio semper fieri debet cum causae 
cognitione, scilicet vt semper inquiratur de forma, et processu electionis, et de persona electi. inf(ra) eo 
(titulo) <c.> nihil (X.1.6.44) et nisi inquiratur non valet confirmatio, arg(umentum) prae(dictae) 
decre(talis) nihil, ff. de transact(ionibus) <c.> cum hi § si praetor (Dig.2.15.8.17)'. Cf. A. Agostinelli, Il 
funzionario di fatto, Campobasso 1920, p. 53. 
111 Baldus, ad Cod.3.34.2, § Si aquam (svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio Codicis (note 52), fol. 218va, n. 
73): '... nam ex quo superior eum habet pro tali ergo a quolibet alio debet haberi, ff. quod fal(so) 
tu(tore) au<c>t(ore) l. i § item pomp(onius) (Dig.27.6.1.5).' 
112 Compare last note with note 100. 
113 Supra, note 99. 
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because of the common mistake as to the status of the agent apparent, but because of 
the superior authority of the judge. In case of ipso iure void election invalidly 
confirmed by the superior authority, on the contrary, the agent apparent does not rely 
on a wide but mistaken belief as to his condition, but on the same authority of the 
judge. A superior authority has by definition a higher iurisdictio.114 And this is why 
‘anyone else must consider him such [i.e. as confirmed]’: because they cannot refuse 
the superior iurisdictio of the higher authority who considers the agent apparent as 
true agent. Being 'in possession of the authority of the superior' ultimately means 
being able to invoke the same higher iurisdictio in support of an otherwise invalid 
title. 
Referring the possession not to the office but to the approbation of the superior 
authority of course does not make up for the lack of the underlying right to represent 
the office, but it leads as close as possible to that result.1 To do that, Baldus changes 
the perspective of the agency triangle. In this case, it is the agent who invokes the 
superior before the third party. The triangle is not drawn from the third party to the 
office, but from from the agent to the office, and only then towards the third. This 
gives strength to the conclusion, for the starting point (from agent towards office) 
points to the internal side of agency, and only then the external side (the relationship 
office-third party) comes into the picture. In other words, it is on the basis of the 
possession of internal validity that the agent apparent is able to exert full external 
validity. Because of this shift in perspective, while falling short of establishing proper 
agency, the concept of possession allows for a subtle approximation to it.  
 
3.4. Possession vs. entitlement: the case of the lex Barbarius 
The most important case where Baldus severs the symmetry between internal and 
external validity of agency is in his comment on the lex Barbarius (Dig.1.14.3). That 
is a complex case of a runaway slave mistakenly believed Roman and elected to the 
praetorship. Because of the importance of that case to our purposes, it could be useful 
to provide its text:115 
 
Barbarius Philippus, while he was a runaway slave, stood as a candidate for the 
praetorship at Rome, and was designated praetor. Pomponius says that his condition as a 
slave was no obstacle to him: as a matter of fact, he did exercise the praetorship. But let 
us consider: if a slave, so long as he hided his condition, discharged the office of praetor, 
what are we to say? That the edicts and decrees he issued will be null and void? Would 
that go to the benefit of those who sued in his court on statutory grounds or on some other 
legal grounds? I think that none of these deeds should be set aside. This indeed is the 
more humane view to take, since the Roman people had the power of confering this 
                                                        
114 It is the higher iurisdictio that defines the higher authority, and so the quality of being superior: the 
higher authority is maior in that it may judge the inferior. Hence the maxim 'that who judges me is 
[my] lord' ('qui me iudicat dominus est’), on which see e.g. the coronation sermon of Innocent III, In 
consecratione Pontificis Maximis, Sermo II (in Id., Opera, Coloniae, apvd Maternvm Cholinvm, 1575, 
p. 189). Cf. Huguccio's Summa, ad C.2, q.5, c.10 (Admont, Stiftsbibliothek, MS 7, fol. 159va, 
transcription in R. Maceratini, Ricerche sullo status giuridico dell'eretico nel diritto romano-cristiano e 
nel diritto canonico classico: da Graziano ad Uguccione, Padova 1994, p. 624). 
115 Dig.1.14.3 (Ulp. 38 ad Sab.): 'Barbarius Philippus cum servus fugitivus esset, Romae praeturam 
petiit et praetor designatus est. Sed nihil ei servitutem obstetisse ait Pomponius, quasi praetor non 
fuerit: atquin verum est praetura eum functum. Et tamen videamus: si servus quamdiu latuit, dignitate 
praetoria functus sit, quid dicemus? Quae edixit, quae decrevit, nullius fore momenti? An fore propter 
utilitatem eorum, qui apud eum egerunt vel lege vel quo alio iure? Et verum puto nihil eorum reprobari: 
hoc enim humanius est: cum etiam potuit populus Romanus servo decernere hanc potestatem, sed et si 
scisset servum esse, liberum effecisset. Quod ius multo magis in imperatore observandum est.'   
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authority to a slave. And if they had known that he was a slave, they would have set him 
free. And the same power must all the more apply in [the case of] the emperor 
 
The text presents several difficulties,116 but to our purposes the crucial element is 
Ulpian's conclusion in favour of the validity of the deeds despite the servile condition 
of the praetor - and so his invalid appointment. The problem was how to justify that 
conclusion. From the Accursian Gloss onwards, the standard approach was to 
presume the exercise of the sovereign power of the people or the emperor towards the 
person of Barbarius: his emancipation would cure the invalidity of the election, and so 
lead to the validity of the deeds done as praetor. 117  Baldus sums up well this 
approach: 'the deeds depend on the status, for if [Barbarius] was not praetor and free, 
his deeds would not be valid. Hence he is praetor and free, so that his deeds be 
valid.'118 To save the validity of the acts, in other words, it was necessary to rescue 
their source first. The problem was that the text of the lex Barbarius was clear in 
denying that the Roman people or the emperor had actual knowledge of Barbarius' 
servitude.119 What the Gloss did amounted to forcing their hand and presuming a will 
they clearly did not possess in order to square the circle. Because of that, the 
interpretation of the Gloss came progressively under attack. Especially after the open 
critique of the most illustrious among the law professors of Orléans,120 Baldus was 
not prepared to endorse it. The slave had therefore to remain such. But this also meant 
that there could be no full internal validity to the relationship between agent and 
office of praetor.121 How could it be possible, then, to hold valid the deeds of the 
praetor apparent towards the litigant parties? 
 
                                                        
116  See esp. N. Rampazzo, Quasi Praetor non fuerit. Studi sulle elezioni magistratuali in Roma 
repubblicana tra regola ed eccezione, Napoli 2008, pp. 366-379, 411-414 and 474-485; R. Knütel, 
Barbatius Philippus und seine Spuren. Falsus praetor, parrochus putativus, Scheinbeamter, in D. 
Schwab, D. Giese, J. Listl, and H.-W. Strätz (eds.), Staat, Kirche, Wissenschaft in einer pluralistischen 
Gesellschaft, Berlin 1989, pp. 345-365, at 345-353; M. Lucifredi Peterlongo, Contributi allo studio 
dell’esercizio di fatto di pubbliche funzioni, Milano 1965, pp. 49-84. Cf. also H. Herrmann, Ecclesia 
Supplet. Das Rechtsinstitut der Kirchlichen Suppletion nach c. 209 CIC, Amsterdam 1968, pp. 66-73. 
117 Gloss ad Dig.1.14.3, § Effecisset (Pandectarvm Ivris Civilis (note 16), vol. 1, col. 131): 'id est 
efficere potuisset. Vel credimus quod fecisset potius quam dignitatem eriperet ... Accursius.' Cf. also 
Gloss ad Cod.7.9.1 (ibid., vol. 4, col. 1537), § manumissus est: 'sic ergo potest dari libertas: vt et ff. de 
offi(cio) praeto(rum) l. Barbarius (Dig.1.14.3).' 
118 Baldus, repetitio ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 57vb, 
n. 10): '... gesta dependent a statu, quia si non esset praetor et liber, non ualerent acta per eum, vt ergo 
ualeant acta per eum, ideo est praetor et liber.'  
119 Supra, note 115. 
120 See esp. the lectura of Guido de Cumis ad Dig.1.14.3 (Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, 
MS 2257, fol. 74rb-va), and the repetitiones on the same Dig.1.14.3 of Jacques de Révigny (Leiden, 
University Library, MS d'Ablaing 2, fols. 17vb-18va) and of Pierre de Belleperche (Madrid, Biblioteca 
Nacional de España, MS 573, fols. 85vb-86va). See further Rossi, Representation and Ostensible 
Authority in Medieval Learned Law (note 72). 
121 This time, Baldus found in Innocent IV not an ally but an opponent, for the pope interpreted the lex 
Barbarius in the same way as the Gloss: the wanting position of the slave was ratified by the emperor. 
Innocent did so to avoid a dangerous objection against his strict rules on confirmation as conditio sine 
qua non to validly discharge the office. Innocent IV, ad X.3.36.8, § Cvm dilectvs filivs (Commentaria 
Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fol. 437vb, n. 2): 'Item non est contra ff. de offi(cio) praeto(rum) <l.> 
Barbarius (Dig.1.14.3) vbi dicitur, quod sententiae latae ab eo, qui erat in possessione tenent, licet 
praetor non esset, sed ibi respondent, illud ideo esse non potest, quia in possessione erat, quia vere 
iudicandi potestatem acceperat ab Imperatore, et omnia alia faciendi, quae ad praetorem pertinebant, 
licet non esset legitimus praetor, sed per obreptionem.' 
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Baldus' answer, once again, is based on the shift from proper entitlement to lawful 
possession of the office. In Roman law, the lawfulness of possession depended on the 
moment of its acquisition. It was therefore necessary to find a way to argue for 
Barbarius’ lawful acquisition of the possession of the praetor's office. Baldus finds it 
in the voidability of Barbarius' election. Because the election was not utterly void (it 
was valid as to its form, but invalid because of the - occult - condition of the 
elected),122 says Baldus, the slave is not a mere intruder in office.123 On the contrary, 
he acquires a 'true but revocable' praetorship:124 
 
if the question is whether Barbarius had a firmly rooted (radicatam et incommutabilem) 
praetorship, the answer is no. But the answer is different if the question is whether he 
had a true and revocable praetorship though unworthily (indigne) received, all the more 
while the defect remains hidden 
 
The revocability of the office depends on the lack of 'rooted' praetorship. Ordinary 
jurisdiction, says Baldus, must 'take root' in its incumbent.125 This particularly strong 
image, signifying the compenetration between agent and office, is used to exclude the 
inhabilis (i.e. the indignus in its legal meaning). The legal incapacity of the slave 
prevents that jurisdiction to 'take root' in his person. 126  A 'rooted' (radicata) 
praetorship would be tantamout to 'unalterable' (incommutabilis), whereas Barbarius' 
praetorship was 'revocable' (revocabilis).127 Just as Barbarius could not have a 'rooted' 
praetorship, he could not enjoy 'rooted' ordinary jurisdiction deriving from that 
office. 128  That would exclude full entitlement to the office, but not legitimate 
possession of it. Hence Baldus’ remark that Barbarius' revocable praetorship was 
'true'.129  
 
                                                        
122 Baldus, lectura ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6),  fol. 55vb, 
n. 22): 'opponitur non valeant gesta a minus legitime electo, ut l. actuarios, C. de nume(rariis) et 
actuar(iis) lib. xii (Cod.12.49(50).7) et ibi no(tatur) ergo non valent gesta Barbarii. So(lutio) Barbarius 
fuit rite assumptus, licet non recte, sed in l. contraria non fuit rite electus, quia per non habentes 
potestatem, et quare non seruata forma a superiore praefixa, et sic non ob(stat), quia rite factum non 
valet ipso iure, sed rite factum licet non recte per eum, qui habet potestatem, valet, licet debeat cassari, 
si debito modo cassatio petitur.' 
123 Baldus, lectura ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 55vb, 
n. 23): 'notandum tamen est quod propter bene agere non iustificat intrusus, quia nec Barbarius 
iustificat omnino in semetipso, dato quod non esset proprie intrusus'. 
124  Ibid., fol. 55va, n. 20: '... aut quaeritur, vtrum Barbarius habebat praeturam radicatam, et 
incommutabilem; et dico quod non, aut vtrum habebat veram praeturam reuocabilem, tamen tanquam 
collatam indigne: et videtur quod eam (sic) fortius est quandiu latuit vitium, et defectus'. 
125 On the point, canon law has not changed much over the centuries. A good way of explaining Baldus' 
statement is comparing it with the 1917 Canon law Code, can. 197 §1: 'Ordinary power of jurisdiction 
is that which is automatically attached to an office; delegated power is that which is committed to a 
person' (Potestas iurisdictionis ordinaria ea est quae ipso iure adnexa est officio; delegata, quae 
commissa est personae). 
126 Baldus, lectura ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 55va, 
n. 19): '... sed iurisdictio ordinaria debet esse radicata, sed in seruo non potest radicari'. 
127 Supra, note 124. 
128  For the medieval jurists, the Roman praetor was an ordinary judge. This appears clearly in 
Barbarius' case. See e.g. Gloss ad Dig.1.14.3, § Vel lege (Pandectarvm Ivris Civilis (note 16), vol. 1, 
col. 130): 'id est iudicio ordinario peracto'. Cf. Gloss ad Coll.4.2.3(=Nov.23.3), § Illo videlicet (ibid., 
vol. 5, col. 205). See further the Speculum of Guillaume Durand, lib. 1, partic. 1, De Iurisdictione 
omnium iudicium, 1. § Expedito (Gvl[ielmi] Dvrandi Episcopi Mimatensis I.V.D. Specvlum Ivris ..., 
Basileae, apvd Ambrosivm et Avrelium Frobenios Fratres, 1574; anastatic reprint, Aalen 1975, vol. 1, 
p. 134, n. 5). 
129 Supra, note 124. 
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When looking at the occult deposition or suspension of the agent from office, and his 
ipso iure void appointment and confirmation for an occult defect, we have see how 
Baldus replaced the concept of entitlement to represent the office with that of 
possession (whether directly of the office or of the confirmation in it). This allowed 
overcoming some strictness and gaps in Innocent’s approach, based as it was on the 
concept of right and never of possession, even if the price to pay was an ambiguity 
unknown to Innocent. Baldus used the idea of lawful possession as a bridge between 
simple facts and proper rights. This bridge was enough to move beyond the first, but 
not to reach the second. Hence the ambiguity. Applied to incorporeals, the ambiguity 
of the concept of possession could only increase. This further ambiguity could be 
played to the advantage of Baldus’ ultimate purpose: allowing for an even deeper 
separation between internal and external validity of agency. Once again, Baldus 
reaches as much by building on Innocent IV first, and then progressively detaching 
himself from the pope. 
Offices are incorporeal.130 Following Innocent, Baldus denies that (quasi-)possession 
of the office might entitle to its valid exercise. To that end, it is necessary the 
confirmation by the superior authority.131 However, the incorporeal condition of the 
office does not allow to think of different degrees of possession: either there is full 
possession of the office or there is none. This is what allows Baldus to reach his aim.  
Offices, says Baldus, are formal entities: they have a form but no specific matter. 
Their form is given by the law, on the basis of the purpose for which they are 
established.132 Thinking of unlawful but legally relevant possession is therefore only 
possible for corporeals, not also for incorporeals and even less for offices. The 
relationship between agent and individual office makes the concept of possession of 
an office significantly stronger than that of possession of a thing. Possessing an office 
means vesting the agent with it. Hence there is full possession or no possession at all: 
as Baldus puts it, one may not be a 'quasi-bishop'. Possession of an office, he 
continues, pertains to the law, not to the realm of facts.133 Possession of a dignitas 
                                                        
130 As such, we have seen, their possession - just as that of other incorporeals - is typically described as 
quasi possessio: cf. supra, § 2.3 and § 3.2, esp. note 84. 
131 This is particularly clear in Baldus' repetitio on the lex Barbarius, where he relies on Innocent IV's 
distinction between cases of quasi possessio in which no confirmation is required and cases in which it 
is needed. Clearly Innocent had in mind ecclesiastical offices, but the distinction is useful for Baldus so 
as to deny the full validity of Barbarius' appointment. Baldus, repetitio ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam 
Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 58ra, n. 12-13): 'Item opp(onitur) et videtur quod 
acta valeant de rigore iuris ex quo barbarius erat in quasi possessione officii. Nam sola quasi possessio 
sufficit in temporalibus, extra de iure pat(ronatus) c. consultationibus (X.3.38.19). Sol(utio) dicit 
Innocen(tius) quod illud est verum in his quasi possessionibus in quibus non requiritur decretum 
superioris, vel in quasi possessione iuris eligendi, et praesentandi; secus vbi requiritur auctoritas 
superioris. Nam si illa sit interposita de iure, valet quod fit de rigore. Si autem de facto, loquitur haec 
lex, et Inno(centius) de elec(tione) c. nihil (X.1.6.44).' 
132 On the point see esp. Baldus, ad Cod.2.18.20, § Tutori vel curatori (svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio 
Codicis (note 52), fol. 142ra, n. 1): 'Tutor vel curator differunt a gestore: quia primorum officium est 
necessarium et finitur necessitate cessante. sed officium simplicis gestoris est voluntarium et voluntate 
propria terminatur. ... Officium quod habet formam a iure sumit effectum vel finem secundum 
dispositionem legalem. Sed officium quod suscepit quaelibet formam secundum voluntatem gerentis 
regulatur ab ipsa.' 
133 Baldus, ad Cod.3.34.2, § Si aquam (ibid., fol. 218rb, n. 64-65): 'Nunc de quarto puncto dicendum 
est s(cilicet) qualiter possessio perdatur. Circa quod dicendum est quod duplex est possessio. Quedam 
est enim indiuisibiis, vt ecce papa et imperator possident plenitudinem potestatis, ecclesia et imperium 
se non secat in partes: nec diuidit se. Item dignitates sunt indiuisibiles: vnde non potest quis esse 
semiepiscopus vel semidoctor. Item et seruitutes vnde non potest quis habere semiuiam et semiusum. 
Sunt enim omnes seruitutes in forma indiuisibili constitute: que forma nisi per perfectione haberi non 
 37 
ultimately refers to the lawful exercise of the office. Indeed, says Baldus following 
again Innocent IV, 'dignity, administration, jurisdiction and office are mutually 
connected and almost inseparable'.134 
The closeness between lawful possession of an office and its lawful exercise has 
another and very important consequence: the possessor does not need to justify his 
possession. A well-established principle, clearly stated in the Accursian Gloss, was 
that the judge does not need evidence to prove what is notorious (and so known to 
everybody), but he does to prove what is known to him personally.135 In recalling this 
principle, Baldus applies it to the exercise of an office. If reiterated and unchallenged, 
the exercise of an office becomes notorious. Widespread reputation as the rightful 
representative of an office, therefore, exhonerates the incumbent from having to prove 
his underlying right to it, for it presumptively suggests de iure entitlement to the 
office.136 
                                                                                                                                                              
potest vnde entibus imperfectis non proprie conuenit forma ff. ad l. falci(diam) l. si is qui quadringenta 
§ quedam (Dig.35.2.80.1). Quedam sunt possessiones diuidue, vt possessio agri et possessio 
vsufructus: quia vsufructus non solum est qualis sed est quantus. ... Item no(tandum) quod quedam sunt 
possessiones quae constitunt officio vel dignitate et sic constitunt in iure, et iste statim perduntur quod 
quis est priuatus dignitate: vt no(tat) Inno(centius) de conces(sione) preben(dae) c. cum nostris 
(X.3.8.6) ... quedam sunt possessiones que constitunt in facto vt possessio fundi: tunc requiritur amotio 
facti nec sufficit amotio iuris ...'  
134 Ibid. (fol. 217va-b, n. 48): 'Nunc accedamus ad Inno(centium) in c. ex literis, de resti(tutione) in 
integrum (X.1.41.4), et ibi tractat Inno(centius) qualiter acquiratur possessio generalis et specialibus in 
iuribus et in rebus ... Primo ergo queritur qualiter acquiratur possessio iuris episcopalis vel 
archidiaconalis ... dicit Innoc(entius) quod possessio generalis iuris episcopalis acquiritur per 
installationem factam in sede deputata in tali dignitate, ar(gumentum) C. de offi(cio) prefec(ti) 
aug(ustalis) l. i (Cod.1.37.1) ... secundum Inno(centium) intellige quod acquiratur generalis possessio 
dignitatis et administrationis et iurisdictionis: nam dignitati inest administratio et administrationi inest 
iurisdictio: vnde sunt annexa et quasi inseparabilia dignitas et administratio et iurisdictio et officium, 
s(upra) vbi et apud quos l. fi. (Cod.2.46(47).3).' 
A similar reasoning might be found in Bartolus. Significantly enough, however, in Bartolus the object 
of quasi possessio was not the office of the judge, but simply his jurisdiction. A forged rescript of the 
prince, says Bartolus, is clearly not sufficient to confer proper entitlement. But if it looks genuine, it 
would suffice to give quasi possessio of jurisdiction, and so to allow its recipient to render valid 
decisions. Bartolus, ad Cod.1.22.2 (In Primam Partem Codicis Bartoli a Saxoferrato Commentaria 
(note 84), p. 110, n. 6): 'Quaero utrum rescriptum omnino falsum quod nunquam emanavit de 
cancelleria Principis tribuat iurisdictionem? ... Mihi videtur quod, si quidem rescriptum non habet 
manifestam falsitatem, ipse iudex, cui videtur dirigi, potest de ista falsitate cognoscere et pronunciare 
se esse vel non esse iudicem. Ita intelligo infra l. prox(imam) [scil., Cod.1.22.3], ubi coram eodem 
iudice potest opponi de falsitate. Ratio: quia illud rescriptum, licet ei non det iurisdictionem, tamen 
constituit eum in quasi possessione iurisdictionis, propter uod habet iustam cognitionem et 
pronunciatonem.'  
135 Gloss ad Cod.2.41(42).1, § In consilio (Pandectarvm Ivris Civilis (note 16), vol. 4, col. 378): 'i(d 
est) in arbitrio siue deliberatione iudicis. Et no(tandum) quod iudex potest iudicare siue attendere id 
quod ei est notum vt notorium: etiam si ei non probatur ab aliqua partium. Erat enim hic notorium eum 
fuisse decurionem. Secus si est notum non vt notorium, sed vt priuato: quia tunc magis ad probationem 
respicit: vt ff. de offi(cio) praesi(dis) l. illicitas § veritas (Dig.1.18.6.1), et i(nfra) de his qui ve(niam) 
aeta(tis) impe(traverunt) l. ii (Cod.2.44(45).2).' 
136 Baldus, ad Cod.2.41(42).1, § In consilio (svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio Codicis (note 52), fols. 
154vb-155ra, n. 7): 'Tertio opp(onitur) quando enim iudex hic considerat publicum officium cum de 
hoc non esset aliquid sibi probatum ab aliqua partium respondet glo(sa) quod hoc erat notorium. Ubi 
ergo officium est notorium non est necessaria probatio, gl(osa) loquitur in officio ordinario. Si ergo 
quis publice gessit se pro potestate vel vicario licet non appareat de electione tamen semper presumitur 
pro ordinaria iurisdictione. Item si quis se gessit pro priore vel consule mercatorum et sic fuit reputatus 
publice, facit l. barbarius de of(ficio) preto(rum) (Dig.1.14.3). Facit etiam l. ciues et incole i(nfra) de 
ap(pellationibus) (Cod.7.62.11). Sufficit ergo quod sit notorium quod aliquis gessit se pro potestate 
priore vel consule ... in notoriis iudex supplet defectum probationis partium'. 
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When the lawful possession of the office does not derive from de iure entitlement to it 
(as in the case of Barbarius), proper representation may not occur. Even so, such a 
possession allows for a shift in perspective, albeit a partial one: if not from individual 
person to lawful agent, at least to lawful possessor of the office. The importance of 
this shift lies in that, as we have just seen, the notorious possession of an office leads 
to the presumption of valid representation.137 As long as this presumption holds, the 
exercise of jurisdiction is therefore valid. This, says Baldus, means that the slave 
Barbarius might even punish those who would recuse his jurisdiction as praetor - 
unless of course they could prove his servile condition and so disprove the above 
presumption. 138  The power to impose one’s jurisdiction over the litigants is not 
mutually incompatible with the litigants' ability to disprove the validity of that same 
jurisdiction. If the litigants were to prove the true status of Barbarius, his possession 
of the office would change from notorious (and so, presumptively lawful) to 
manifestly abusive.139 
The crucial point is that, until disproven, the notorious possession of an office is 
sufficient to its lawful exercise. On a practical level, this brings possession of the 
office very close to full representation, while remaining different in principle. The 
issue of recusation helps to clarify the difference. When the office is 'rooted' in the 
person, the agent may continue to validly represent the office despite the supervening 
incapacity: the friction between incapacity qua individual and capacity qua agent is 
precisely the core of Innocent IV's concept of toleration, which is ultimately a way of 
prolonging the validity of proper representation by stressing the link between agent 
and office and underplaying the (typically, supervenient) unworthiness of the 
                                                        
137 Baldus, lectura ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 56va, 
n. 35): '... Et no(tandum) quod materia l(egis) nostrae habet locum in his, quae sunt ratione publici 
officij, non in alijs, extra de consuet(udine) c. <cum> dilectus (X.1.4.8) secundum Innoc(entium), et in 
his quae tangunt ius aliorum, non solius facientis, vel patientis, extra, de procu(ratoribus) <c.> consulti 
(X.1.38.15) per Inno(centium). Illud est no(tandum) quod pro eo qui in possessione iurisdictionis 
ordinarie inuenitur, praesumitur, licet hic status naturaliter inesse non possit, de offi(cio iudicis) 
deleg(ati) <c.> cum in iure (X.1.29.31), per Ino(centium) etc. ... arg(umentum) contrarium: quia nemo 
praesumitur officialis, nisi probetur, l. prohibitu(m) C. de iur(e) fi(sci) lib. x (Cod.10.1.5), vide 
Cy(num) C. vbi causa sta(tus) l. i. Et no(tandum) quod lex loquitur de eo, qui non debuit admitti ad 
officium: tamen admissus est.' Cf. Cinus de Pistoia, ad Cod.3.22.1 (Cyni Pistoriensis In Codicem et 
aliquot titulos primi Pandectarum tomi, id est Digesti veteris, doctissima commentaria … Francofurti 
ad Moenum, Impensis Sigismundi Feyerabendt, 1578; anastatic reprint, Frankfurt-am-Main 2007, vol. 
1, fol. 152rb, esp. n. 7). 
138 Baldus, lectura ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 55vb, 
n. 26): 'Et adde, quod ille qui sine causa declinat iurisdictionem, potest puniri de contemptu 2 q. 7 c. 
Metropolitanum (C.2, q.7, c.45), in glo(sa) et Inn(ocentius) dicit quod potest verus contumax reputari, 
quia non videtur stetisse declinans suam iurisdictionem, secundum Innocentium, et ideo Barbarius 
potuisset punire friuole declinantes suam iurisdictionem, puta quia opponebatur alia exceptio quam 
seruitutis, vel obiecerunt de servitute, et non provaverunt'.  
On the subject see also Baldus, cons.2.177 (Consiliorvm sive Responsorvm (note 28), fol. 48rb). Asked 
whether the defendant had the power to jail someone, Baldus answered that they did: just like 
Barbarius, they had quasi possessio of jurisdiction, and that was sufficient as to exercise it. 'D(omini) 
Antiani sunt in quasi possessione istius iurisdictionis, quod sufficit ad eius exercitium, vt ff. de offi(cio) 
prae(torum) l. Barbarius (Dig.1.14.3)'. 
139 Baldus made the same point (though in a less elaborate fashion) when discussing on possessory 
matters, so as to distinguish between falsus praelatus in unchallenged possession of the office and 
simple intruder. Baldus ad Cod.3.34.2, § Si aquam (svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio Codicis (note 52), 
fol. 218ra, n. 62): 'Aut quis est in possessione sed non est verus prelatus: et tunc aut possidet pro 
prelato ita communiter reputatur, aut pro possessore quia inuasit de facto officium prelati. Primo casu 
agere potest nisi aduersarius probet eum non prelatum: quia pro eo presumitur qui in pacifica 
possessione reperitur'.  
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individual serving as agent. When the person qua agent is entitled to represent the 
office, then the condition of the person qua individual, so long as non manifest, is of 
no obstacle to the continuation of valid representation. In that case, says Baldus, those 
subjected to the (jurisdiction of the) office could not recuse its legal representative 
because of his personal unworthiness. 140  By contrast, when the person has just 
notorious possession of the office but not a proper right to hold it, the link between 
agent and office is more fragile: when the personal incapacity of the possessor 
becomes manifest, the link between possession and lawful exercise of the office is 
severed.  
 
Lawful possession of the office without de iure entitlement to it ultimately leads to 
the same consequences as the case of the occult deposition. Neither the occult 
deposed from office nor the slave mistakenly considered as praetor are de iure agents 
of the office they possess: in both cases, there is no valid internal agency. The validity 
of their deeds – and so, the external validity of agency – rests only on the lawful 
possession of the office. In both cases the notoriety of their possession is not (or no 
longer) coupled with the underlying right to discharge the office they publicly 
possess. This is why secret deposition did not produce the full consequences of 
manifest deposition: the difference does not lie in the lack of physical dispossession, 
but in the public or occult character of the deposition itself. Not issuing a formal 
sentence of deposition (which would have made the deposition notorious)141 could be 
construed as a partial revocation of the initial confirmation by the superior authority, a 
revocation that does not produce its full effects. This allowed Baldus to speak of a 
‘vestige’ of the initial confirmation in office, and so to argue for a fragile but enduring 
link with the office itself.142  
In the case of the slave-praetor Baldus ultimately adapts the same reasoning to 
different circumstances. Rejecting the solution of the Gloss (presumed emancipation 
of the slave to rescue his praetorship), Baldus leaves Barbarius in his servile 
condition. At the same time, however, he does not condemn the praetorship as well: 
Barbarius’ praetura is ‘true’ even if ‘revocable’. 143  Almost paradoxically, the 
revocability of the praetorship is what makes it ‘true’. The election is voidable – and 
not utterly void - because the personal defect (slavery) is not manifest. Just as the 
secretly deposed, the incapacity of the agent is occult. In one case (secretly deposed) 
this occult character of the legal impediment allowed to retain lawful possession of 
the office, in the other (slave-praetor) it allows its acquisition: Barbarius can enter 
lawfully in office, and so he acquires lawful possession of it. If the defect in the 
person were to become known, the slave-praetor would of course lose lawful 
                                                        
140 Baldus, ad X.1.3.13, § Sciscitatus (Baldvs svper Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 28ra-b, n. 8): 'Quero an 
<iudici> ordinario possit opponi exceptio quod est homicida vel adulter. Respondeo non secundum 
Inn(ocentium) quia autoritas ordinarij officij non excluditur per solam infamiam facti superuenientem 
officio iam radicato.' 
141 Even if the crime is not manifest, says Baldus elsewhere, the legal condemnation makes it notorious. 
The crime is not manifest in itself, but it is presumed to be such. And this presumption is irrebuttable. 
The sentence of deposition of the unworthy, therefore, operates on two levels: it both renders the 
indignitas notorious and it establishes judicially its truth. Cf. Baldus, ad X.3.2.7, § Vestra (Baldvs 
svper Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 259rb, n. 2): 'Sed pone quod nullo modo factum est probatum [the 
subject was the fornicating priest], et tamen sententia condemnatoria est lata: nunquid crimen dicatur 
notorium? Respondeo sic, propter authoritatem sententie que habetur pro veritate, vt ff. de re(gulis) 
iur(is), l. res iud(icata) (Dig.50.17.207).' 
142 Supra, note 86. 
143 Supra, note 124. 
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possession of the office – but so would the occult deposed if his deposition became 
manifest. Until that moment, however, both slave and deposed would retain lawful 
possession of an office to which neither is entitled. 
 
Possession is the visible face of the underlying right. It does not look at the inner 
relationship between person and thing (the entitlement to it), but at its external 
manifestation. It should project to the outside the consequences of that entitlement, 
that is, the right to hold the thing - in our case, to exercise the office validly. Speaking 
of possession of the office, Baldus highlights the external face of representation 
without bestowing validity to the internal relationship between person and office. 
While the agency triangle is always the same, the focus is no longer on the internal 
side (person-office) but on the external one (office-thirds).  
We have seen this shift in focus with regard to the agent secretly deposed from office: 
relying on possession, Baldus could argue for the validity of his deeds without 
however qualifying that case as toleration - and so, proper representation. The occult 
deposed is thus neither an intruder (in which case there would be no external validity 
of agency) nor properly tolerated in office (where on the contrary there would be full 
internal validity of agency). Stressing the occult character of the deposition, Baldus 
highlighted the (limited) lingering effects of the confirmation by the superior 
authority (the ‘vestige’ of confirmation in office). This way, he could push the occult 
deposition just outside the threshold of proper representation - but very (and 
ambiguously) close to it. In the case of the occult slave discharging the office of 
praetor, Baldus moves from the opposite direction to arrive to the very same point: he 
pulls the slave-praetor towards representation, coming as close as possible to its 
threshold without crossing it - and so without reaching the scope of agency. Just as 
the occult deposed from office, also with the slave Barbarius the practical outcome is 
very similar to proper toleration in office. In principle, however, the difference 
between title and possession remains clear. This avoids a plain self-contradiction: the 
Innocentian concept of toleration presupposes confirmation, but confirmation would 
lead to the same position of the Gloss (emancipation of the slave leading to de iure 
validity of his praetorship, and so full symmetry between internal and external 
validity of agency). Stressing the element of possession of the office, and especially 
of its ordinary jurisdiction, Baldus reaches nearly the same result in practice - but not 
in law. 
 
The ultimate purpose of Baldus’ reliance on possession was to reach the same 
practical outcome as Innocent’s concept of toleration without accepting its 
preconditions – chiefly, subordinating the external validity of agency to the internal 
one. Having affirmed that Barbarius had a 'true and revocable praetorship ... while the 
defect remains hidden',144 Baldus seeks to reach the outcome of Innocent’s concept 
(its procedural consequences), skipping its (substantive) foundations:145 
 
therefore the deeds are valid as if [done] by the true praetor, albeit unworthy, who is to 
be stripped of his praetorship by the superior. The same applies to any dignitas, whether 
secular or ecclesiastical, because of the jurisdiction that attaches to it (as in Innocent's 
comment on X.1.3.13) 
                                                        
144 Supra, note 124 
145 Baldus, lectura ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 55va, 
n. 20): 'et ideo valent gesta tanquam a vero praetore, licet minus digno, et cui praetura per superiorem 
esset interdicenda. Et idem dico in omnibus dignitatibus, quia est annexa iurisdictio, sive sint seculares 
vt hic, siue sint ecclesiasticae, hoc sensit Inn(ocentius) extra de rescri(ptis) c. sciscitatus (X.1.3.13).' 
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The ambiguity of Baldus’ mention of Innocent can be better appreciated looking at 
what Innocent actually meant. In his comment on X.1.3.13 the pope denied to the 
litigant parties the faculty to raise any objection against the jurisdiction of the 
ordinary judge on the basis of his personal status. First, Innocent maintained, the 
judge should be deposed from office.146  
For the pope, the validity of the jurisdictional deeds of the (ordinary) judge147 is a 
consequence of his toleration in office. The sentence is therefore valid because it is an 
external manifestation of the internal relationship between agent and office. 
Toleration in office entails the right to exercise it: to prevent external manifestations 
of agency, it is therefore necessary to cut the (internal) link between agent and office 
first. Much unlike Baldus, for Innocent the lawful possession of jurisdiction is only an 
external consequence of the underlying agency relationship, a tangible manifestation 
of the underlying right.  
The slave Barbarius lacks that underlying right, so he is not entitled to the office. 
Baldus’ position on lawful possession of the office, however, is deeply different from 
that of the pope. Applied to Barbarius’ case, this means that the slave-praetor is 
neither entitled to the office de iure, nor does he exercise it only de facto. As Baldus 
put is, Barbarius is 'one who never was in office de iure, but de facto in coloured 
possession'.148 The dichotomy de iure / de facto does not leave room to a third genus: 
ultimately, Barbarius is still praetor only de facto. But the voidable election (and so, 
the ‘revocable praetorship’) leads to the lawful acquisition of possession of the office. 
If Barbarius does not sit in the office de iure, he is no intruder either. This 
intermediate position is well defined in terms of coloured possession: a lawful 
possession of the office that, from the outside (i.e. moving from the external side of 
the agency triangle), would point to the underlying right of the incumbent (suggesting 
the validity of the internal side, without however proving it). This way, Baldus’ idea 
of 'coloured possession' of the office is ultimately an indirect route towards Innocent's 
concept of toleration.  
It remains to be seen to what extent can possession of the office replace its legal 
entitlement and, especially, what consequences can it produce. 
 
3.5. Breaking Innocent's symmetry: external validity vs. internal invalidity of 
agency in the lex Barbarius 
There is an important advantage to speak of possession of office and not of legal 
entitlement to it: possession allows to keep a distance between person and office. The 
lack of full representation, in other words, highlights the difference between the two 
                                                        
146 Cf. Innocent IV, ad X.1.3.13, § Sciscitatus (Commentaria Innocentii Quarti (note 27), fol. 12ra, n. 
2): 'Sed quaeritur, an hae exceptiones de impotentia iuris vel facti contra ordinarium possint opponi? 
Respondeo, hae exceptiones locum habent contra delegatum, contra ordinarium autem quandiu 
toleratur in dignitate, locum non habent, ut notat(ur) infra de offic(io) delegat(i) <c.> cum super 
(X.1.29.23) ... Item nec praetextu infamiae vel seruitutis sententia retractabitur. Item not(andum) quod 
infamis non potest se excusare a iudicando, nisi excipiatur contra eum, arg(umentum) C. de 
decu(rionibus) <l.> nec infamis et l. infamiam (Cod.10.32.10 and 8), ff. de offi(cio) praeto(rum) <l.> 
Barbarius (Dig.1.13.4).' 
147  Clearly, Innocent referred only to ordinary jurisdiction, not also delegated one. The point is 
ultimately not dissimilar from the case of the bishop and of his vicar that we have seen earlier: just as 
only the bishop is the representative of the bishopric, and not also his vicar, so the link between office 
and person is only with the ordinary judge, not also with the delegate one. Cf. supra, § 2.2.  
148 Baldus, repetitio ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 58va, 
n. 27): 'Quandoque quis nunquam fuit in officio de iure, sed de facto in colorata possessione, et 
loquitur l(ex) nostra [scil., Dig.1.14.3].' 
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subjects. The office cannot be considered as willing and acting through its agent, who 
can therefore exercise on it a kind of control legally weaker than full entitlement.  
Moving from a bidimensional image of the office, which therefore coincides with the 
person discharging it, for the Accursian Gloss it was imperative that the person of the 
slave Barbarius became true praetor. That was the only way for the source (the person 
of Barbarius acting as praetor) to produce valid legal deeds. Any other solution would 
have jeopardised the litigant parties that relied on the validity of the source of the 
deeds. Hence, for public utility considerations, Accursius imputed to the Romans the 
presumed will to set the slave free so as to make up for his legal incapacity. 
If Baldus refuses to follow the Gloss in its approach, he does not reject its public 
utility considerations. And those considerations require that the source of the deeds be 
preserved. But in Baldus the scenario is, so to say, three-dimensional: the person of 
the agent does not fully coincide with the office, which remains a different subject. 
This is all the more the case when the agent is not fully (i.e. de iure) legitimate to 
represent it. The source of the deeds is not the person vested with the praetorial 
powers, but the office of praetorship itself. This is why, as we have seen, Baldus 
speaks of 'true praetorship' and not of 'true praetor',149 and why he refers the concept 
of toleration directly to the deeds and not to Barbarius.150 Public utility is a strong 
argument in favour of the validity of the source of the deeds. On this Baldus agrees 
with the Gloss. In Baldus, however, that source is no longer Barbarius, but the office 
itself:151  
 
you may on the contrary say that he [Barbarius] enjoyed a true praetorship because of 
this lex, for this lex is based on considerations of equity and public utility. Those 
considerations however support the acts of Barbarius, not of Barbarius himself. 
Therefore his acts are valid, but Barbarius is not praetor. Just as it is possible to have the 
exercise of a dignitas where there is no dignitas, so it is possible to discharge the office 
of guardian without true wardship because of the uncertainty as to the [validity of the] 
appointment (as in Cod.3.31.6).152 Equity does not favour the person of Barbarius nor 
his personal status. This is clear both from the fact that, running away, Barbarius 
became a thief and a criminal (as in Cod.6.1.1),153 and from the fact that he sneaked up 
on the people hiding his incapacity 
 
                                                        
149 Supra, text and note 124. 
150  On the point see also Baldus, repetitio ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem 
Commentaria (note 6), fol. 58va-b, n. 27-28): 'Nam si in l(ege) nostra [scil., Dig.1.14.3] essent gesta 
postquam depositionis sententia esset lata contra barbarium, et tunc gesta non valerent, ut no(tat) 
Inno(centius) de accu(sationibus) c. qualiter (X.5.1.24) in glo(sa) magna. Sin autem est alias adempta 
iurisdictio propter errorem ipsius, adhuc acta tolerantur, de resti(tutione) spol(iatorum) c. audita 
(X.2.13.4) et de hoc tangitur i(nfra) si cer(tum) pet(etur) l. eius, in princ(ipio) (Dig.12.1.41) et facit 
quod no(tandum) i(nfra) de condi(cione) inde(biti) l. si non sortem § qui filio (Dig.12.6.26.8)', 
emphasis added. 
151 Baldus, lectura ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 55rb, 
n. 15): 'aut dicit eum fuisse in vera praetura per rationem huius l(egis) tunc cum ratione huius l(egis) sit 
aequitas, et publica vtilitas, et illae rationes faueant actib(us) Barbarii, sed non Barbario; ergo acta 
valent, sed Barbarius non est praetor, et sic inuenitur administratio dignitatis, ubi non est dignitas, sicut 
invenitur administratio tutelae, absque vera tutela ratione dubii, vt C. de peti(tione) hae(reditatis) l. si 
putas (Cod.3.31.6), quod enim aequitas non faueat personae Barbarii, nec eius statui (sic), apparet, quia 
fugiendo erat fur et criminosus, C. de ser(vis) fu(gitivis) l. i (Cod.6.1.1) et quia obrepsit populo tacendo 
suam inhabilitatem.' 
152 Cf. Baldus, ad Cod.3.31.6, § Si putas (svper Primo, Secvndo et Tertio Codicis (note 52), fol. 201ra, 
n. 6). 
153 Cod.6.1.1 stated that the runaway slave commits the theft of himself. 
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This passage explains why Baldus is always so careful in distinguishing entitlement 
from possession of the office. The accent is on the exercise of the office, which is 
valid for public utility reasons. But public utility is invoked for the benefit of the 
commonwealth, to make the deeds valid. Qualifying the deeds as valid for the sake of 
public utility means applying public utility directly to the relationship between office 
and people (i.e. third parties). The Gloss and its followers did the same but, moving 
from the assumption that person and office coincided, they did not distinguish the 
valid exercise of the office from the lawful position of Barbarius - the second was 
necessarily instrumental to the first.  
Public utility justifies the 'exercise of the dignitas where there is no dignitas', says 
Baldus. The ambiguity is intentional, and it would be lost had he spoken of office 
(officium).154 Referring to dignitas for both office and Barbarius, Baldus highlights 
their contrast. The slave remains legally incapable to represent the office de iure, he is 
indignus of that dignitas first of all in the 'technical' sense of legal incapacity.155 The 
contrast between the dignitas of the praetorship and the indignitas of the slave 
discharging it does not abate with the intervention of public utility. Much on the 
contrary, public utility magnifies that contrasts, for it highlights the difference 
between the two sides of the agency triangle. Baldus invokes public utility directly 
with regard to the external side, to justify the validity of the exercise of the office for 
the sake of the recipients of the deeds (the litigant parties). This does not mean 
skipping the office entirely and invoking public utility directly towards the third 
parties (and so, holding the void deeds as valid for their sake), but rather using public 
utility to hold valid the relationship between office and third parties (and so holding 
the deeds valid). As with the Gloss, also in Baldus the deeds are still valid because of 
public utility considerations. But, crucially, those considerations now operate in 
favour of the external side of agency, the relationship office-thirds.  
 
Looking at the external side of agency, in turn, calls for the internal one. This leads to 
the most innovative element of Baldus' approach: the exercise of the office by the 
unworthy who cannot lawfully (de iure) represent it is valid for the recipients of the 
deeds, not for himself:156 
 
as there may be found nothing in Barbarius but for coloured title and coloured 
possession, then he is praetor with regard to the others, but not to himself 
                                                        
154 This intentionality seems to be indirectly confirmed by the opposite approach of Baldus in other 
contexts. To stress the difference between the eternal dignitas of the Crown and the mortal nature of its 
incumbent, for instance, sometimes Baldus speaks of office to describe the position of the latter. This is 
the case at the very beginning of his commentary on the Code, where Baldus states that the 'the office 
of the emperor is for the term of his life' (Baldus, ad Const. De novo codice componendo, § Oportet 
preuenire, svper Primo, Secvndo et Tertio Codicis (note 52), fol. 2vb, n. 8, emphasis added). Had he 
spoken of dignitas, the statement would have made considerably less sense. 
155 Immediately after the above passage, Baldus continues to play with the ambiguity of the term 
dignitas. This is the only time in the lectura on the lex Barbarius where he associates Barbarius with 
the adjective worthy (dignus). In so doing, Baldus does not seek to justify Barbarius' exercise of the 
office, but to invoke a punishment on him for having done as much: 'Barbarius was liable of several 
crimes, so he is worthy (dignus) of punishment'. This way the two-sided concept of dignitas 
strengthens the contrast between Barbarius and the office. Baldus, lectura ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam 
Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 55va, n. 16): 'Barbarius plura delicta cumulauit, 
vnde poena dignus est'. On Baldus' use of dignitas against the slave Barbarius see also the repetitio ad 
Dig.1.14.3, ibid., fol. 57vb, n. 10: 'Barbario autem fauere, qui decepit populum, indignum est, et 
maxime quia criminosus, et infamis non habuit canonicum ingressum.' 
156 Baldus, lectura ad Dig.1.14.3 (ibid., fol. 55rb-va, n. 15): 'vnde nihil videtur in Barbario reperiri nisi 
coloratus titulus, et colorata possessio: est ergo praetor quo ad alios, non quo ad se.' 
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Baldus' concept of 'coloured title' is the transposition of the 'coloured possession' to 
the internal side of the agency relationship. Strictly speaking, a coloured title does 
not exist. The title looks at the inner relationship between office and incumbent - 
either there is title or there is not. So Baldus normally refers only to coloured 
possession of the office,157 since possession looks at the external side of agency. 
Invoking public utility, in the present case Baldus deliberately highlights the contrast 
between the two faces of agency. Coloured possession of the office - lawful 
possession without the underlying title to represent it de iure - allowed the slave-
praetor to exercise the office. Because of public utility considerations, this exercise 
was valid towards third parties - that is, as to the external side of agency, the 
relationship between office and the people. Barbarius' praetorship is therefore not 
utterly void, but 'true'.158  At the same time, however, this praetorship cannot be 
'rooted' in the person of a slave because of his (legal) indignitas, therefore it remains 
'revocable'.159 Seen from the internal side of agency, a revocable praetorship is no 
praetorship at all, so the title remains only a coloured one. This is why Baldus looks 
first at the external side of agency, insisting on the effects of lawful possession, and 
only then does he move to the internal side. Because the moment the focus shifts 
towards the inner relationship, that between agent and office, possession becomes 
irrelevant. Possession can produce legally relevant consequences only to the outside - 
from the office to the thirds. When looking at the inner relationship agent-office, the 
lack of a valid title leaves only one possible conclusion: lack of agency. Because the 
triangle was drawn moving from the external side first, however, Baldus can both 
deny the internal validity of agency (person-office) and affirm the validity of the 
external one (office-thirds) for the sake of public utility: 160 
 
it is not important to the commonwealth that Barbarius be praetor, but that the deeds be 
valid for the common mistake. So we may conclude that Barbarius did not enjoy a true 
praetorship but a putative one, and that he was praetor only in name and in the exercise 
[of the office] with regard to the others and not to himself, for he did not have a true 
dignitas 
 
This passage explains further what said in the previous one: Barbarius 'is praetor with 
regard to the others, but not to himself'.161 This, it may be recalled, was itself an 
                                                        
157 Baldus, supra, note 148, and Id., ad X.1.6.44, § nichil (Baldvs svper Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 
69vb, n. 10): 'Sed si ad exercendum iurisdictionem non sufficeret possessio colorata sequeretur 
inconueniens quod interim in re publica ius non redderetur et fieret spelunca latronum. Oportuit ergo 
mediam iuris dispositionem inueniri propter emergentes casus quae dilationem non recipiunt et non 
expectant plene discutionis euentum super proprietate ipsius iurisdictionis, istud est naturaliter certum 
quod facte cause: vbi gratia si latro interim suspensus est non possunt retractari quia non possunt reduci 
in pristinum statum'.   
158  Supra, text and note 124. Cf. also Baldus, ad X.1.3.14, § Quoniam autem (Baldvs svper 
Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 29va, n. 2): 'Item quod qui demonstrat non datur quod iurisdictio potest 
esse absque exercitio ff. de stat(u) ho(minum) l. qui furere (Dig.1.5.20), sed interdum est exercitium 
absque natura et radicabili iurisdictione, ff. de offic(io) preto(rum) l. barbarius (Dig.1.14.3). Ibi 
exercitium in possessione fundatur imo in publica vtilitate saltem aptitudine.' 
159 Supra, text and note 124. 
160 Baldus, lectura ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 55va, 
n. 15-16): 'Item non interest Reipublicae quod Barbarius fit praetor, sed quod acta valeant propter 
communem errorem bene interest Reipublicae: quare concluditur, quod Barbarius non sit in vera 
praetura, sed putatiua, et quod ipse fuit praetor nomine et administratione quo ad alios non quo ad se: 
quia non habuit veram dignitatem.' 
161 Supra, text and note 156. 
 45 
adaptation of the conclusion reached with regard to the prelate secretly suspended 
from office, who 'may do anything as to the others, but not as to himself''.162 Baldus' 
analysis of the slave-praetor's case leads therefore to the full separation of the two 
faces of agency. He rejects the internal validity while at the same time affirming the 
external validity. Barbarius was praetor only 'in name' and lacked 'a true dignitas', so 
had no title to the office. But he was praetor as to 'the exercise' of that same dignitas: 
from the outside, its exercise was valid.163 Barbarius is not true praetor, but his 
praetorship is valid towards the thirds. 
 
This crucial point is further explained in Baldus' repetitio on the same lex 
Barbarius. 164  If 'the deeds depend on the status', 165  then public utility should 
necessarily be invoked with regard to the person of Barbarius (the old position of the 
Gloss: the validity of the deeds depends on that of their source). However, 
distinguishing between person and office and stressing the importance of lawful 
possession of the office, Baldus can reach the opposite conclusion without 
jeopardising the public utility argument:166 
 
although he was not praetor de iure, it sufficed to the parties that he was praetor de facto 
... Therefore, if you said that Barbarius was praetor, and that his appointment had validity 
                                                        
162 Supra, text and note 92. 
163 In opposing the validity of Barbarius' praetorship 'to the others' and denying it 'to himself', Baldus 
seems to echo Belleperche's reading of the same Dig.1.14.3, although the approach of the Orléanese 
jurist was very different. Rejecting the validity the source and focusing exclusively on the validity of 
its deeds, Belleperche looked at the relationship between deed (the sentence) and third party (the 
litigant parties). This let him to consider the deed unlawful (non legitime factum) as to Barbarius, but 
lawful as to its recipients. Belleperche, repetitio ad Dig.1.14.3 (Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional de España, 
MS 573, fol.86vb): 'Dico immo licet ex parte ipsius non legitime fecit, tamen ex parte litigantium sic, 
ideo etc. Nam error communis excusat ideo etc. iuxta illud error comunis facit ius ut hic et i(nfra) de 
sup(pellectili) l(egata) l. iii. (Dig.33.10.3) et C. de testis l. i. [Cod.4.20.1, sed 'de testamentis', 
Cod.6.23.1].' On the subject of the lex Barbarius, among the Orléanese jurists Baldus shows good 
knowledge only of Belleperche. See esp. Baldus, additio ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris 
Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 59rb-va, esp. n. 5 and 11. On the position of Belleperche see further 
Rossi, Representation and Ostensible Authority in Medieval Learned Law (note 72). 
164 It should be noted that the same repetitio ad Dig.1.14.3 was also ascribed to Bartolus. See e.g. 
Bartoli a Saxoferrato in Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria Cvm Additionibvs, Basileae, Ex 
officina Episcopiana, 1588, pp. 115-121. The text of the repetitio can be found in any printed edition of 
both Bartolus and Baldus. Manuscript sources offer limited help on the point, because the repetitio may 
be found in a single manuscript - of Bartolus (BL Arundel 473, fols. 247ra-249va). Despite that, the 
content of the repetitio clashes altogether with Bartolus' lectura on the same lex Barbarius 
(contradicting every single section of it, with no exception), whereas it matches perfectly that of Baldus 
in all its parts. Some late medieval and early modern scholars rejected Bartolus' authorship on the basis 
that the repetitio refers to Aristotle, Sallust and Cicero – whose mention is wholly alien to Bartolus’ 
style but perfectly suited to that of Baldus. See esp. Jason de Mayno, ad Dig.1.14.3 (Excellentissimi 
iuris utriusq[ue] doctoris domini Iasonis de mayno Mediolane[n]sis Lectura in prima parte ff. veteris 
..., Venetijs, per Baptistam de Tortis, 1512, fol. 36va-b), and then Thomas Diplovatatius, Liber de 
claris iuris consultis, pars posterior, s.v. 'Bartolus' (F. Schulz, H. Kantorowicz and G. Rabotti (eds.), 
Bononiae 1968=Studia Gratiana, vol. 10), p. 275, ll. 7-13). Cf. Lepsius, Prätor und Prokonsul (note 1), 
p. 228, note 12. The question of the authorship of the repetitio is exceedingly complex and it may not 
be solved in a few lines: see again Rossi, Representation and Ostensible Authority in Medieval Learned 
Law (note 72). 
165 Baldus, repetitio ad Dig.1.14.3, supra, note 118. 
166 Ibid.: '... licet non esset praetor de iure, sufficit quo ad litigantes quod erat praetor de facto, C. de 
senten(tiis) l. si arbiter (Cod.7.45.2) et ar(gumentum) l. i de testa(mentiis) (Cod.6.23.1). Si ergo dicis 
Barbarium esse praetorem, et creationem suam habere ualentiam in seipsa, hoc redundat ad priuatam 
vtilitatem Barbarij, non ad bonum publicum ... praesupponere Barbarium praetorem esset fustra 
respectu publica vtilitatis, quia licet sit oppositum, valerent gesta, et seruatur publica vtilitas.' 
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in itself, that would be unnecessary, for it would go to the private benefit of Barbarius, not 
to the common good. ... In respect of public utility, maintaining that Barbarius was 
praetor would be in vain: the opposite solution would suffice as to the validity of the 
deeds and the preservation of public utility 
 
For the validity of the deeds - that is, for the external side of agency - Barbarius' 
factual exercise of the praetorship would suffice. It would, because Barbarius was 
not a mere intruder: Baldus saw to that by stressing the importance of the voidability 
of the election, which gave to the secret slave a 'true and revocable praetorship'.167 
Not being intruder, Barbarius was not wholly false praetor. At the same time, 
however, he was no de iure praetor either, being legally incapable to represent the 
office. This opposition is the key to separate external from internal validity of 
agency:168 
 
if we maintain that [Barbarius] was not praetor as to himself but that he should be 
considered praetor as to the others, it is necessary to explain something. One thing is to 
object 'you have not been made', another is to say 'you cannot be'. Where there is neither 
fact nor law, it is possible to raise the exception of false. Where on the contrary 
something is true as to the facts but not as to the law, one cannot be considered as false 
(falsus), but legally incapable (inhabilis) 
 
What the slave Barbarius lacked was not the fact of the election to the praetorship, 
but rather the legal requirements allowing that fact to result in his de iure entitlement 
to the office. The issue therefore is not of falsitas, but of inhabilitas. Inhabilis is that 
who lacks dignitas in its 'technical' sense of legal capacity. This way, the question 
becomes very similar to that of the incompetent judge. We have seen that, for 
Baldus, the possession of ordinary jurisdiction allows Barbarius to impose his 
jurisdiction over the parties, so long as the underlying defect of servitude (and so, the 
legal incapacity) remains hidden or anyway not proven.169 Discharging the office of 
praetor, Barbarius was not truly judge, but he appeared such to the litigants. The 
question is not simply a difference between appearances and reality, but between 
lawful possession and legal entitlement.170 Barbarius was not true praetor, but he 
received lawful possession of the praetorship because he entered in office after being 
elected, while the inhabilitas remained occult. The difference between 'true praetor' 
and 'true praetorship' is relevant only as to the inner relationship between person and 
office. With regard to any third party (and so, for the external side of agency), 'true 
praetorship' is sufficient as to the validity of the deeds, because the deeds are not 
those of Barbarius but of the praetorship. Saying that Barbarius' deeds are valid only 
'as to the others' denies the agency relationship with the office, and links the office 
directly to those subjected to its jurisdiction (i.e. the thirds parties). 
                                                        
167 Supra, text and note 124. 
168 Baldus, repetitio ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 57vb, 
n. 12): 'sed tenendo, quod quantum ad se non fuerit praetor, sed quo ad alios praetor debeat reputari, 
tunc oportet soluere, quae alia est exceptio "tu non es creatus", alia "tu non potest esse". Nam vbi abest 
factum et ius est exceptio falsi, et hoc non hic, quia non erat defectus in facto sed in iure, vbi vero adest 
veritas facti sed non iuris, iste non dicitur falsus sed inhabilis, vt no(tatur) in de proc(uratoribus) l. quae 
omnia (Dig.3.3.25)'. 
169 Supra, note 138. 
170 Baldus, repetitio ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 
58ra, n. 16): '... Et sic dicatur quod Barbarius non fuit liber nec praetor, ergo fuit iudex incompetens: 
quo(modo) acta valent? Respondeo quo ad subditos iudex competens esse videtur, ut s(upra) dixi; sed 
in seipso secus. Sicut ergo non potest habere dominum, ita non potest habere iurisdictionem, 
ar(gumentum) de statu ho(minum) l. qui furere (Dig.1.5.20).' 
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The distinction between internal and external validity of agency in Baldus' approach 
to the slave-praetor's case is strictly dependent on the separation between person and 
office. For Baldus, the parties are never two (agent and thirds) but always three. 
Barbarius is the agent, but the agent is not fully identified with the office he 
represents. Insisting on the relationship office-third parties, Baldus is able to shift the 
question from whether the agent is entitled to validly represent the office to whether 
the office can validly issue the deeds. Drawing the agency triangle from the outer 
side and then moving to the internal side allows to reach opposite conclusions that 
can be both be justified. Allowing for the validity of the relationship between office 
and thirds (because of public utility triggered by the common mistake as to the status 
of the slave) does not imply also ratifying the relationship between office and agent. 
The slave Barbarius, says Baldus elsewhere with metaphysical transport, 'was not in 
the true substance of the office'. And truth, he continues, is the other face of being.171 
It would follow that Barbarius was nothing. That, however, applies only to the inner 
relationship between Barbarius and the office, not to the external relationship 
between the office of judge and the parties of a lawsuit:172 
 
Barbarius was nothing as to himself; but he was something as to the parties litigant 
 
The oppositon between internal and external validity of agency - the invalidity of the 
praetorship as to himself and its validity as to the others - is not present in previous 
civil lawyers. To reach it, Baldus builds on the separation between person and office 
of Innocent IV. 173  Between Baldus and the pope, however, there is a crucial 
difference: for Innocent the external validity of agency (the validity 'as to the others') 
always depended on its internal validity (validity 'as to himself'). Toleration allowed 
to overcome the indignitas of the person qua individual focusing on the person qua 
agent. And it was on that basis that the office could act validly towards the thirds. To 
highlight the distinction between individual and agent, Innocent brought the person 
qua agent as close as possible to the office.174 This closeness allowed shifting the 
focus from the unworthiness of the individual to the enduring legal capacity of the 
agent (i.e. the concept of toleration in office). At the same time, however, it did not 
leave much room to the office as a different subject from the agent representing it. 
As a result, Innocent required absolute symmetry between internal and external 
validity of agency: the relationship between office and thirds is strictly dependent 
upon that between agent and office. Keeping distinct agent from office, Baldus could 
go beyond Innocent, and fully separate the two 'sides' of agency.  
 
The difference between internal and exernal validity of agency is particularly evident 
in another additio of Baldus on the same lex Barbarius. There, Baldus moves from 
                                                        
171 Baldus ad Cod.7.45.2, § Si arbiter (svper Primo, Secvndo & Tertio Codicis (note 52), fol. 52va, n. 
16): 'Et ideo dicunt doc(tores) in l. barbarius (Dig.1.14.3), quod licet valeant gesta tanquam solenniter 
facta: tamen barbarius non erat in vera substantia officij. Concordat regula philosophi dicentis: quod 
ens et verum conuertuntur, et vnum quodque sicut se habet ad esse sic ad veritatem, secundo 
metaphi(sicae).' Cf. N. Horn, Philosophie in der Jurisprudenz der Kommentatoren: Baldus 
philosophus, 1 (1967) Ius Commune, pp. 104–149, at 148. 
172 Baldus, repetitio ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 58ra, 
n. 16): 'Concludamus ergo tres finales conclusiones. Prima est de Barbario quod non fuit praetor. 
Secunda de actib(us) exercitis quod valuerunt. Tertia quod barbarius nihil fuit quod ad se, sed quo ad 
litigantes aliquid fuit. Et sic casu, et fortuna populus Romanus fuit seruus, et subiectus suo.' 
173 Cf. Rampazzo, Quasi Praetor non fuerit (note 116), pp. 433-34. 
174 Supra, esp. § 3.1. 
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the invalid election of the prelate whose incapacity remains however occult, to look 
at Barbarius' case from the perspective of the thirds - and so, once again, from the 
external side of agency:175 
 
I rather think that the deeds are valid if [Barbarius] is in possession, if that is supported 
by the common mistake and it furthers public utility. I prove it this way. A prelate is 
bound to his subjects to render them justice, and may be compelled to do as much ... 
This is an obligation in rem (realis), for the dignitas itself is bound to its subjects to do 
as much, and that amounts to a real right. So it is as if the collectivity of the subjects had 
quasi possessio176 of this right ... Hence I argue that this possession of the subjects 
justifies the legal proceedings in their favour because of their good faith, given that the 
prelate was in bad faith. 
 
Here, the focus on the outer side of agency is even more pronounced than in most 
other cases that we have seen. Invoking public utility directly on the relationship 
between office and thirds on the one hand, and fully distinguishing between 
obligations of the office and of the person on the other, Baldus can even think of a 
real right of the third party towards the office. The obligation of the office of the 
judge is to grant justice to those under its jurisdiction. Described this way, the 
obligation clearly refers to the office, not to the person of the agent. And so Baldus 
qualifies it as a real right - a right against a thing, not a person. The holder of that 
right is the commonwealth (the collectivity of those under the office's jurisdiction), 
and the presence of the commonwealth allows public utility considerations. In suing 
before the illegitimate agent (Barbarius or the prelate), the people are exercising their 
right against the office. The simple possession of the office (instead of de iure 
entitlement) suffices as to its valid exercise because of the good faith of the people 
(which triggers public utility). But the validity is only towards the commonwealth 
(external validity) and not to the agent (internal validity), who has no entitlement to 
the office, and so no right to it. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
While the second part of this study looks mainly at the case of the slave-praetor, it 
should not be seen in isolation from - or even in opposition to - the first. In the first 
part, we have focused on the physiology of representation. In the second, on its 
pathology. In law, the pathology of a subject helps to better understand its physiology: 
to make sense of a set of rules, one should look at the most problematic cases where 
they apply. Because defining something means first of all circumscribing it, we can 
appreciate the scope of a rule only by looking at border-cases. Thus the slave-praetor 
is not an exception to Baldus' concept of representation, but a good occasion - 
                                                        
175 Baldus, additio ad Dig.1.14.3 (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem Commentaria (note 6), fol. 59rb, 
n. 9-10): 'Verius credo quod valeant gesta, si est in possessione, et communis error et publica vtilitas 
hoc suadent. Hoc probo. Prelatus est obligatus subditis ad faciendum eis iustitiam, et potest ad hoc 
cogi, in Auth. de quaestore § super hoc [Coll.6.8, § super hoc(=Nov.80.7); the same obligation may 
also be found in Coll.9.14.9, § super hoc(=Nov.128.23)]. Item est obligatio realis, nam ipsa dignitas est 
obligata subditis ad hoc, et sic ex hoc resultat ius reale. Igitur quasi possidetur hoc ius ab vniuersitate 
subditorum. ... Ex hoc concludo quod ista quasi possessio subditorum iustificat processum in eorum 
fauorem propter eorum bonam fidem, dato quod prelatus habeat malam fidem'. Cf. esp. Baldus, additio 
ad Dig.1.8.6.1, § Vniuersitatis (In Primam Digesti Veteris Partem (note 6), fol. 49vb). 
176 Baldus writes of quasi possessio both because that specific right lacks a corporeal dimension (cf. 
supra, note 84), and especially because a collectivity may not possess in the same way as an individual 
person: cf. e.g. Baldus ad X.2.14.9, § Contingit (Baldvs svper Decretalibvs (note 26), fol. 156vb, n. 38). 
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probably, the best one in Baldus' whole opus - of looking at its inner dynamics. The 
acts of the slave-praetor are not valid despite Baldus' understanding of representation, 
but precisely because of it. Normally, causa proxima and causa remota - agent and 
office - act in mutual harmony. This means that, when the individual office acts 
towards third parties, we do not see a triangle but only a segment - the relationship 
between person and third. Even if we do not see it, however, the triangle is there. It 
becomes clearly visible only when the person cannot validly represent the office, and 
the internal validity of agency is called into question.  
In the concept of representation of Innocent IV, the office tends to identify with the 
person. There is however a subtle line between integration and assimilation. For 
Baldus, the office is never thoroughly assimilated to the person. Even when the office 
remains on the background and the agent is on the front, the stage, so to say, is always 
three-dimensional. Highlighting the direct imputation of legal obligations to the 
office, its separation from the agent lingers on even when the agent has full title to 
represent the office. So, we have seen, even the king cannot bend the office into doing 
something that would defile its dignitas. This was something that Innocent never said. 
When the deeds would detract from the dignitas of the office, therefore, they remain 
deeds of a private individual and may not be ascribed to the office, so they are void. 
The dignitas of the supreme office of the Crown relates to the commonwealth: the 
direct relationship between office and the people (the external side of agency) works 
as a constraint to the relationship between agent and office (the internal side of 
agency). Hence the main obligation of the king was preserving the state of the 
commonwealth (status regni), because that obligation was first and foremost of the 
Crown towards the commonwealth, to the point that it even defined the Crown 
itself.177 The external side of agency - the relationship between office and thirds - 
helps defining the nature of public offices, and it colours that relationship with public 
utility.  
Highlighting the external side of agency, and the public utility underpinning the 
relationship between public office and the commonwealth, Baldus underplays the 
invalidity of the internal side. Invoking public utility when looking at the relationship 
between commonwealth and praetorship, as Baldus does, means highlighting the 
obligation of the office of the judge towards the collectivity. The strength of that 
obligation allows to overcome the wanting status of the agent - the slave Barbarius. 
Both in the case of the Crown and in that of the office of the judge the principal 
relationship is between office and people; the one between office and agent becomes 
somewhat secondary. The same rationale used to deny the validity of the deeds of the 
true agent (the king lawfully sitting on the throne) is ultimately applied to ascribe 
valid effects to those of the false agent (the slave unlawfully sitting on the bench).  
                                                        
177 See first of all the classical study of Post, note 19, esp. pp. 269-290. It is significant that in his 
discussion Post links this concept with that of the inalienability of those Crown's rights considered 
necessary for public utility reasons (ibid., esp. pp. 280-282). 
